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New Rules of War in the Battle of the
Experts
AMENDING THE EXPERT WITNESS
DISQUALIFICATION TEST FOR CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST
“Treat your friend as if he will one day be your enemy,
and your enemy as if he will one day be your friend.”1
INTRODUCTION
Picture this: a law firm is representing a group of residents
who brought a class action lawsuit against a multimillion-dollar
corporation, alleging that the corporation contaminated the
community’s drinking water by releasing a hazardous chemical
into a tower cooling system. The polluted water, according to the
complaint, caused severe medical complications and physical
defects in over 600 residents. Imagine further that the law firm
hired—for the class action plaintiffs—an expert, Dr. Anderson, to
help prepare for the case and to testify on the community
members’ behalf about the toxicity to humans of the chemical
released into the water supply.2 Dr. Anderson signed a retention
letter with a confidentiality clause.3 The law firm provided Dr.
Anderson with confidential documents, including a memorandum
that specified the facts and background of the case, scientific
methodology used in the litigation, and counsel’s view on key
issues and trial strategies.4 In addition, the law firm’s assigned
attorney had nearly 30 telephone conversations with Dr. Anderson,
during which the lawyers discussed in detail highly confidential
1 CHAS. W. FREEMAN, JR., THE DIPLOMAT’S DICTIONARY (1993) (quoting
Laberius, c. 45 B.C.).
2 This portion of the hypothetical is based on the facts of Rhodes v. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 558 F. Supp. 2d 660, 663 (S.D.W. Va. 2008).
3 Id. at 668 (“The retention letter, written by the Firms, states: ‘This letter
confirms that you have been retained by the [Firms] on behalf of their clients, to provide
expert services for the Plaintiffs in connection with the referenced litigation . . . . The expert
services you are performing are confidential.’” (quoting Retention Letter, Mem. Supp. Pls.’
Mot. Disqualify, ex. A)).
4 Id.
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trial strategies.5 After months of these discussions, Dr. Anderson
suddenly notified the law firm that she no longer wished to serve
as its expert witness and suggested that the law firm hire her
colleague, Dr. Gray—which the law firm ultimately does.6
Now imagine that a number of plaintiffs who were
originally included in the litigation—and whose confidential
information was disclosed to Dr. Anderson—were unable to
proceed in the class action due to a technicality.7 The plaintiffs
who are unable to proceed in the first case then file a separate
class action, which is practically indistinguishable from the first
litigation. They sue the same defendant, retain the same law firm,
and allege that the defendant engaged in the same tortious
conduct.8 Finally, these plaintiffs get their day in court.
Dr. Gray, who was the expert for the first class of
plaintiffs, is also hired by this class of plaintiffs. The law firm
anticipates that the defendant will employ its own expert. But to
its shock and dismay, the law firm discovers that the defendant’s
testifying expert is none other than Dr. Anderson—the same
expert that the law firm had previously retained—but more
significantly, the same expert who was given access to the law
firm’s confidential files relating to the case and who knows the
law firm’s trial strategy. The plaintiffs file a motion to disqualify
Dr. Anderson from testifying against them, which in turn causes
them significant financial costs, interrupts the trial proceeding,
and leaves the law firm and the plaintiffs feeling betrayed. This
particular scenario is not difficult to envision; in fact, this is
exactly what happened in Rhodes v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours &
Co.9 In that case, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of West Virginia granted plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify Dr.
Anderson.10 The plaintiffs in Rhodes were successful at precluding
their former expert—to whom they disclosed confidential
information—from using that same confidential information to
the plaintiffs’ detriment. This particular outcome, however, is
quite rare, as courts frequently hold that expert disqualification is
a drastic remedy.11
5 Id.
6 Id. at 669.
7 These plaintiffs were unable to proceed in this class action because the
chemical’s presence in their water supply was either undetectable or fell below the
average concentrations in the other plaintiffs’ water supply. Id. at 670.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 672.
11 Bone Care Int’l, LLC v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., No. 08 c 1083, 2009 WL
249386, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2009) (“The disqualification of experts is ‘a drastic measure
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Although the expert in Rhodes was disqualified for a
conflict of interest, courts currently lack guidance from statutory
law or procedural rules that would assist them in determining
when an expert has conflicting interests. As a result, there is
uncertainty in the expert disqualification test. The confusion that
has developed surrounding expert disqualifications can have
costly consequences in an area of litigation that is already
expensive.12 In civil litigation, the “big business” of retaining
experts has corrupted the adversarial process and undermined the
role that expert testimony plays at trial. Attorneys relentlessly
shop for experts,13 knowing that the winner of “the battle of the
experts”14 often determines the winner of the war. A litigant
choosing to hire an expert witness understands that this choice will
often be the difference between winning or losing—making expert
witnesses “rare commodities”15 in a “cottage industry.”16
As federal and state dockets have become flooded with
more complex and technical litigation,17 expert witnesses have
inundated the courtroom. Expert witnesses are indispensable in
which courts should hesitate to impose except when absolutely necessary.’” (quoting
Owen v. Wangerin, 985 F.2d 312, 317 (7th Cir. 1993))); BP Amoco Chem. Co. v. Flint Hills
Res., LLC, 500 F. Supp. 2d 957, 960 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Lacroix v. BIC Corp., 339 F. Supp. 2d
196, 199 (D. Mass. 2004) (“[C]ourts are generally reluctant to disqualify expert
witnesses . . . .”); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp., 734 F. Supp.
334, 339 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (“The court perceives no need to exercise the extreme remedy of
disqualifying an expert in this situation. . . .” (emphasis added)).
12 See English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden Labs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498, 1505 (D.
Colo. 1993) (“[C]ostly litigation of collateral issues concerning expert disqualification
can be avoided.”).
13 Douglas R. Richmond, Regulating Expert Testimony, 62 MO. L. REV. 485,
486 (1997); L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness Testimony: Back to the Future, 29 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1389, 1415 (1995). This note uses “experts” to refer to expert witnesses
hired to testify at trial, as opposed to consulting witnesses.
14 Id. at 1395 n.38 (citing William S. Bailey, Expert Witnesses in the Sound-
Bite Era, 29 TRIAL, Feb. 1993, at 65, 69).
15 Maya M. Eckstein & Paul Nyffeler, The Expert of My Enemy Is My Expert:
Conflicts of Interest Amongst Expert Witnesses, 17 VA. ST. B.LITIG.NEWS, Summer 2012, at 1.
16 Cordy v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 156 F.R.D. 575, 582 (D.N.J. 1994). The
demand for expert witnesses in civil litigation has spurred an industry of “professional
witnessing.” The term “professional witnesses” refers to expert witnesses who are not just
experts in their respective field but who are also experts (in the nonlegal sense) in
testifying. Professional witnesses have perfected the art of testifying and use their
“position and authority to maximum effect” in favor of their clients. RICHARDO. LEMPERT
ET AL., AMODERNAPPROACH TOEVIDENCE 1152-53 (5th ed. 2013).
17 Mitsubishi Elec. Corp. v. Ampex Corp., 190 F.3d 1300, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“It
is well recognized that the persuasiveness of the presentation of complex technology-based
issues to lay persons depends heavily on the relative skill of the experts.”); David
Sonenshein & Charles Fitzpatrick, The Problem of Partisan Experts and the Potential for
Reform Through Concurrent Evidence, 32 REV. LITIG. 1, 3 (2013).
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civil litigation,18 and important trial strategy decisions are often
behind the decision to tender an expert witness.19 Just recently,
Apple, Inc. brought an action against its competitor, Samsung
Electronics Co., alleging infringement of several patents relating to
smartphones and tablets.20 Samsung countersued, alleging that it
was Apple that infringed on Samsung’s patents. What followed was
a lengthy and expensive battle of the experts. Both
telecommunications giants presented dozens upon dozens of expert
witnesses, whose areas of expertise ranged from wireless
communication systems21 to mobile computing22 to computer
graphics.23 The expert-witness fees for both sides were
staggering24—Apple alone spent over $2.5 million on expert
witnesses.25 Although Apple is a multibillion-dollar corporation,
18 Rhodes v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 558 F. Supp. 2d 660, 662 (S.D.W.
Va. 2008) (“Litigants, courts, and juries have certainly benefitted greatly by the guidance
and direction provided by expert testimony.”).
19 Eymard v. Pan Am. World Airways, 795 F.2d 1230, 1233 (5th Cir. 1986);
Douglas R. Richmond, Expert Witness Conflicts and Compensation, 67 TENN. L. REV.
909, 909 (2000) (“Many cases could not be tried without expert witnesses to testify as to
the applicable standard of care, the reconstruction of accidents, or the value of a
plaintiff ’s damages.”) [hereinafter Richmond, Expert Witness Conflicts].
20 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
21 Apple retained Edward William Knightly, Ph.D., as an expert in wireless
communication systems and networking protocols. Testimony of Plaintiff ’s Expert
Witness, Edward William Knightly, Ph.D. at 3438, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
678 F.3d 1314 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. C-11-01846 LHK), 2012 WL 10920061.
22 Apple retained Mani Bhushan Srivastana, Ph.D., as an expert in mobile
computing. Testimony of Plaintiff ’s Expert Witness, Mani Bhushan Srivastava, Ph.D.
at 3290, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. 678 F.3d 1314 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. C-11-
01846 LHK), 2012 WL 10920059.
23 Samsung hired Andries Van Dam, Ph.D., as an expert in computer
graphics. Testimony of Defendants’ Expert Witness, Andries Van Dam, Ph.D. at 2850-
51, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. C-11-01846
LHK), 2012 WL 10920051.
24 Charles Babcock, Apple, Samsung Expert Witnesses Reap Big Bucks, INFO.
WK. (Aug. 23, 2012, 12:07 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/mobile/mobile-devices
/apple-samsung-expert-witnesses-reap-big-bucks/d/d-id/1105935? [http://perma.cc/W2D5-
SKBU]; see infra note 26 and accompanying text.
25 The aggregate amount of experts’ fees was calculated by adding individual
experts’ compensation, a number acquired from public sources. It is likely that the
aggregate amount is significantly higher, since public records state that other experts
testified on behalf of Apple, but their compensation was not disclosed during trial
testimony. Additionally, it is highly plausible that both sides hired consulting experts
whose compensation was not disclosed. Apple’s expert witnesses and their compensation
include (1) Susan Kare, Ph.D., an expert in the design of icons and screen graphics, who
was compensated $80,000 for her testimony (Testimony of Plaintiff ’s Expert Witness
Susan Kare, Ph.D. at 1363, 1477, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314 (N.D.
Cal. 2012) (No. C-11-01846 LHK), 2012 WL 10920041); (2) Edward William Knightly,
Ph.D., an expert in wireless communication systems and networking protocols, whose 300
hours of preparation at a $475 hourly rate was worth $140,000 (Testimony of Plaintiff ’s
Expert Witness Edward William Knightly, Ph.D. at 3438-39, Apple Inc. v. Samsung
Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. C-11-01846 LHK), 2012 WL 10920061); (3)
Paul Dourish, Ph.D., an expert in the field of user interface technology for computer-
based embedded systems, whose 200 hours at $400 per hour was worth $80,000
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the fees its experts charged are not extraordinary; these experts’
hourly rates fall within the standard range of expert
compensation. Expert witnesses often charge their clients
anywhere from $500 to $1,000 an hour,26 making “expert
witnessing”27 a rather lucrative profession.28
The burgeoning expert-witness business raises concerns
about the integrity of the adjudication process, especially in civil
litigation.29 Due to the specialized role of expert witnesses and a
rising demand for expert testimony,30 it is common for the same
expert to testify for opposing clients in different cases on “similar
or identical issues.”31 Some experts intentionally switch sides in
the midst of a trial, taking their former clients’ confidential
information with them to their former clients’ adversaries. This
situation creates the potential that such experts will—intentionally
(Testimony of Plaintiff ’s Expert Witness Paul Dourish, Ph.D. at 3191, Apple Inc. v.
Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. C-11-01846 LHK), 2012 WL
10920057); (4) Dr. Tony Givargis, an expert in the field of software design and embedded
systems, whose 400 hours of preparation at $275 per hour was worth $110,000
(Testimony of Plaintiff ’s Expert Witness Dr. Tony Givargis at 3223, Apple Inc. v.
Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. C-11-01846 LHK), 2012 WL
10920058); (5) Mani Bhushan Srivastana, Ph.D., an expert in the field of mobile
computing, whose 225 hours of preparation at a $425 hourly rate was worth $95,625
(Testimony of Plaintiff ’s Expert Witness Mani Bhushan Srivastana, Ph.D. at 3290-91,
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. C-11-01846 LHK),
2012 WL 10920059); (6) Ravin Balakrishnan, Ph.D., an expert in the field of computer
science and human-computer interaction, whose hourly rate is $430, gave testimony
worth $150,000 (Testimony of Plaintiff ’s Expert Witness Ravin Balakrishnan, Ph.D. at
1726-27, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. C-11-01846
LHK), 2012 WL 10920044); (7) Hyong Kim, Ph.D., an expert in wireless communications
and networks, whose 500 hours of preparation at a $450 hourly rate was worth $225,000
(Testimony of Plaintiff ’s Expert Witness Hyong Kim, Ph.D. at 3326, Apple Inc. v. Samsung
Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. C-11-01846 LHK), 2012 WL 10920060); (8)
Dr. Russell S. Winer, an expert in marketing, gave testimony worth $50,000 (Testimony of
Plaintiff ’s Expert Witness Dr. Russell S. Winer at 1498, 1531, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs.
Co., 678 F.3d 1314 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. C-11-01846 LHK), 2012 WL 10920042); (9) Terry
Musika, an expert in intellectual property damages, who calculated Samsung’s
infringement damage to Apple, was paid $1.75 million (Testimony of Plaintiff ’s Expert
Witness, Terry Musika at 2037-38, 2052, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. C-11-01846 LHK), 2012 WL 10920047).
26 Sonenshein & Fitzpatrick, supra note 17, at 6-7. In a survey of almost
1,000 expert witnesses, the average hourly fee reported for testifying in court was
$451; the highest hourly fee for court testimony in the sample was $5,000. JAMES J.
MANGRAVITI ET AL., SEAK INC., SURVEY OF EXPERTWITNESS FEES 6 (2014).
27 Rhodes v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 558 F. Supp. 2d 660, 662
(S.D.W. Va. 2008) (citing Kendall Coffey, Inherent Judicial Authority and the Expert
Disqualification Doctrine, 56 FLA. L. REV. 195, 196 (2004)).
28 Id.; see also LEMPERT ET AL., supra note 16, at 1130 (“Many
[experts] . . . advertise their services . . . and earn substantial sums of money from this
line of work.”).
29 See Rhodes, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 662 (“The increased use and importance of
experts in litigation has raised numerous questions regarding conflicts of interest.”).
30 See id.
31 LEMPERT ET AL., supra note 16, at 1130.
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or inadvertently—share this information with their new client to
the detriment of the former client. Situations where an expert
witness switches allegiances midtrial—to testify in the same
litigation for which the former client retained the expert—
regularly warrant the expert’s disqualification32 and serve as the
exception to the common notion that disqualification of experts is
an extreme measure.33 Many conflicts of interest, however,
naturally arise without any indication of ill intent but nonetheless
pose the threat of unauthorized disclosure of confidences.
Most conflicts of interest among experts stem from
instances where Client X retains an expert witness to testify
against Client Y, after which the expert terminates the
engagement with Client X only to serve as an expert witness for
Client Y in the same or substantially similar case against Client X.
This was the scenario presented in Rhodes.34 In Rhodes, a law
firm that represented community residents who brought a class
action tort claim against Du Pont Co., a chemicals company, hired
an expert, Dr. Anderson. After the community residents disclosed
confidential information to Dr. Anderson relating to the case, Dr.
Anderson terminated this engagement and was later retained by
Du Pont to defend its case against the community residents. This
scenario illustrates an expert conflict of interest that warrants
disqualification—a remedy not easily granted by federal or state
courts.35 When a client chooses to hire an expert previously
retained by that client’s adversary, a conflict of interest arises
because the expert has been chosen twice: once by the first client
and once by that client’s adverse party. The risk of a conflict is
magnified when the expert leaves a former client and takes that
client’s confidential information to that client’s adversary. This
note focuses on the scenario in which adverse parties have, at one
point, retained the same expert to testify in the same or
substantially similar case—triggering the expert disqualification
test for conflicts of interest.
To ensure fairness and integrity in the adjudication process,
the American Bar Association (ABA) and state legislatures have
established Rules of Professional Conduct governing conflicts of
interest among attorneys. While strict rules regulate such
conflicts, similar statutory or procedural rules governing conflicts
32 Rhodes, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 666 (“‘[N]o one . . . seriously contend[s]’ that blatant
side-switching by an expert within the same litigation should be permitted.” (quoting Wang
Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (E.D. Va. 1991))).
33 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
34 See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
35 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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of interest among experts are virtually nonexistent.36 There is no
federal or state law that governs the disqualification of expert
witnesses, and neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure37 nor
any of their state equivalents discuss expert disqualification.
Furthermore, expert witnessing does not adhere to any
professional ethical code.38 Indeed, aside from a small amount of
precedent, “there is virtually nothing in print to guide” courts in
assessing conflicts of interest among experts.39
Currently, the only avenue to disqualify an expert for a
conflict of interest is through the inherent judicial authority of
presiding judges.40 Yet most state and federal courts do not
conform to one set of controlling or guiding principles to analyze
conflicts of interest among expert witnesses. The lack of procedural
rules or professional standards to regulate expert disqualification is
a recipe for disaster. Judges often must speculate about how to
interpret the expert disqualification test, which contributes to
contradictory rulings and precedent. The absence of clearly
articulated standards to govern expert disqualification—and
inconsistent guidelines for retaining experts—have led to unduly
36 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 184 F.R.D. 410, 413 (D. Utah 1999);
Eckstein & Nyffeler, supra note 15; see Kendall Coffey, Inherent Judicial Authority and
the Expert Disqualification Doctrine, 56 FLA. L. REV. 195, 196, 205 (2004).
37 Coffey, supra note 36, at 197 n.6 (“[C]onflicts of interest based on prior
services or contracts are not directly addressed in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure . . . .”). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(B) provides that “Rule
26(b)(3)(A) and (B) protect drafts of any report or disclosure required under Rule
26(a)(2).” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3)(A) protects the disclosure of “documents
and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for
another party or its representative (including the other party’s attorney, consultant,
surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent).” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3)(B)
specifies that the protection from disclosure extends to “mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of a party’s attorney or other representative concerning the
litigation.” But in reference to expert witnesses, Rule 26(b)(4)(B) severely limits the
aforementioned protections. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(B); Palmer v. Ozbek, 144 F.R.D.
66, 67 (D. Md. 1992) (“Nothing in the language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B) precludes a
party from retaining an expert previously consulted by his opponent.” (footnote omitted)
(quoting Riley v. Dow Chem. Corp., 123 F.R.D. 639, 640 (N.D. Cal. 1989))).
38 Coffey, supra note 36, at 196; Steven Lubet, Expert Witnesses: Ethics and
Professionalism, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 467 (1999) (“A few organizations have
attempted to draft codes of conduct for expert witnesses, but none have achieved broad
acceptance.” (footnote omitted)).
39 Healy v. Counts, 100 F.R.D. 493, 495 (D. Colo. 1984); see In re Ambassador
Grp., Inc., Litig., 879 F. Supp. 237, 241-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (“[T]here is relatively little
authority on expert disqualification.”); Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 762 F. Supp.
1246, 1248 (E.D. Va. 1991) (“Circumstances similar to those at bar [motion to disqualify]
are not common. Not surprisingly, therefore, the parties have cited no controlling
authority directly on point.”); Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271, 277
(S.D. Ohio 1988) (“There appears to be little case law dealing with the issue of
disqualification of expert witnesses.”).
40 Coffey, supra note 36, at 196-97; In re Ambassador Group, Inc., Litig., 879
F. Supp. at 241.
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delayed proceedings, additional litigation expenses, and general
distraction from the substantive matters at trial.41 Ambiguities in
how courts apply the disqualification test result in a failure to
preserve client confidentiality and threaten the “integrity of the
judicial process as a whole.”42 Chief Judge Goodwin of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia criticized
the current lack of direction, stating that “clarification of the
proper standard is . . . [to] ensure that attorneys and experts have
a clear idea of what conduct will result in disqualification; without
detailed guidance, experts may be disqualified for conduct they
did not know was inappropriate.”43 The dissonance among courts
calls into question the wisdom and application of the
disqualification test.
This note proposes a clear and comprehensive standard
that courts should adopt to resolve the current confusion
surrounding expert disqualification due to conflict of interest.
Part I of this note provides background information on the rules
governing conflicts of interest among expert witnesses. This
discussion further demystifies the traditional two-prong expert
disqualification test, which applies when (1) opposing clients
retain the same expert to testify in separate cases against each
another; or (2) one party retains an expert formerly retained by
the adverse party to testify in the same case. Part II explores the
consequences that the lack of a bright-line rule—or at least a
workable standard—has for expert disqualification and highlights
the impracticality of the traditional test. Part III advocates for the
modification of the traditional expert disqualification test. First, it
proposes a two-prong disqualification test meant to ameliorate
the current ambiguities in the disqualification test by mandating
disqualification only where a client and expert are in a contractual
relationship and the client discloses confidential information on the
subject matter of the challenged litigation. Next, Part III argues
that the ABA should establish preventive measures for experts
and attorneys in order to avoid situations where the
disqualification test must apply.
41 See SECTION OF LITIG., ABA, ABA GUIDELINES FOR RETENTION OF EXPERTS
BY LAWYERS (2012) [hereinafter ABA GUIDELINES DRAFT], http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/38th_conf_session10_aba_
guidelines_for_retaining_experts_4-18-12.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/RG77-QWAP]
(draft as of April 18, 2012, later withdrawn from consideration).
42 See id. at 6.
43 Rhodes v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 558 F. Supp. 2d 660, 666
(S.D.W. Va. 2008).
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Given the “big business”44 of expert witnesses and the
consequences of variations in the application of the disqualification
test, there is a need to reform the current disqualification test for
expert witnesses. The current state of confusion among federal and
state courts regarding the disqualification test undermines the
integrity of court proceedings, notions of fairness, and consistency
in court rulings. The dissonance among judges in their
interpretation of the standard expert witness disqualification,
coupled with the ever-rising use of expert testimony in civil
litigation, compels the need to modify the current expert
disqualification test.
I. TRADITIONAL TEST FOR EXPERTWITNESS
DISQUALIFICATION
A series of federal trial court decisions analyzing conflicts
of interest among expert witnesses paved the way for the expert
witness disqualification test. The seminal case of Paul v.
Rawlings Sporting Goods Co.45 established a two-prong expert
disqualification test, which—at least conceptually—both federal
and state courts have accepted as the governing test to resolve
conflicts of interest in the expert witness context. Under this
traditional analysis, courts consider (1) whether it was objectively
reasonable for the moving party to conclude that a confidential
relationship existed between client and expert, and (2) whether the
moving party disclosed confidential or privileged information to
the expert.46 The two prongs of the traditional test are
independent inquiries, both of which must be answered in the
affirmative to warrant disqualification of the expert.47 In other
words, to disqualify an expert for a conflict of interest, the court
must find the existence of a confidential relationship between the
expert and the former client, during which the former client
disclosed confidential or privileged information to the expert.48
The burden to prove both a confidential relationship and
disclosure of confidential information falls on the party seeking
disqualification.49 The moving party thus has a high burden of
44 Richmond, Regulating Expert Testimony, supra note 13, at 486.
45 Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
46 See, e.g., id. at 278; Koch Ref. Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreaux MV, 85 F.3d
1178, 1182 (5th Cir. 1996); Mayer v. Dell, 139 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1991).
47 Rhodes, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 666; Koch Ref. Co., 85 F.3d at 1181.
48 Gordon v. Kaleida Health, No. 08-CV-378S(F), 2013 WL 2250506, at *5
(W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013).
49 Id. A minority of courts place an additional burden on the moving party to
prove that the alleged confidentiality was not subsequently waived by the client.
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proof, and the movant cannot meet its burden with “mere
conclusory or ipse dixit assertions.”50 If either of the two
propositions are answered in the negative—for example, if
disclosures of privileged or confidential material were made
without a reasonable expectation of a confidential relationship,51
or if a confidential relationship existed but no significant
disclosures were undertaken52—it would be “inappropriate for
the court to dictate to the expert or his new employer that his
participation in the case be limited or eliminated.”53 Additionally,
the mere existence of a confidential relationship does not
presume that confidential information was exchanged.54
Conversely, the disclosure of confidential or privileged information
does not presume a confidential relationship.55 Since the
widespread adoption of this two-prong test, critical differences
have emerged among courts in their application and
interpretation of the two prongs.
A. Defining a Confidential Relationship
The first prong of the disqualification test—whether
counsel was objectively reasonable in perceiving the existence of a
confidential relationship—is an area of disagreement among
courts. Across jurisdictions, courts agree that the moving party’s
subjective belief that it has established a confidential relationship
Greene, Tweed of Del., Inc. v. DuPont Dow Elastomers, L.L.C., 202 F.R.D. 426, 429
(E.D. Pa. 2001); United States ex rel. Cherry Hill Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Healthcare
Rehab Sys., Inc., 994 F. Supp. 244, 249 (D.N.J. 1997); English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden
Labs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498, 1501-02 (D. Colo. 1993); Nikkal Indus., Ltd. v. Salton,
Inc., 689 F. Supp. 187, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
50 Greene, Tweed of Del., Inc., 202 F.R.D. at 429; Nikkal Indus. Ltd., 689 F.
Supp. at 191 (“That burden is not, of course, discharged by mere conclusory or ipse
dixit assertions, for any such rule would foreclose meaningful inquiry into the existence
of the relationship, and any spurious claims could never be exposed.”).
51 See, e.g., Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (E.D.
Va. 1991) (citing Estate of George S. Halas, Sr. v. Comm’r, 94 T.C. 570, 577 (1990)
(expert not disqualified where no confidential relationship existed between an
appraiser and the taxpayer)).
52 See, e.g., Lacroix v. BIC Corp., 339 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201 (D. Mass. 2004)
(finding the existence of a confidential relationship, but denying disqualification for
failure to satisfy the second prong of the test).
53 Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271, 278 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
54 Northbrook Digital LLC v. Vendio Servs., Inc., No. 07-2250 (PJS/JJG),
2009 WL 5908005, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 26, 2009) (“[W]here the moving party cannot
show a reasonable expectation of a confidential relationship with an expert, it is
immaterial whether that expert received confidential information from the moving
party.”); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp., 734 F. Supp. 334,
337-38 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
55 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. EMC Corp., 330 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1094 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (“[A] confidential relationship is not necessarily established just because some
information concerning the litigation is shared.”).
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with the challenged expert is irrelevant to the inquiry.56 Similarly,
the expert’s perception of a confidential relationship with the
movant is immaterial. Beyond this, however, courts have rarely
agreed on a consistent standard for analyzing the first prong of
the disqualification test.
Federal and state courts have considered many factors in
determining whether a confidential relationship exists between
an expert and the moving party. Some judges will not inquire
beyond the existence of a confidentiality agreement, while others
explicitly reject this limited inquiry.57 For example, a magistrate
judge in the Southern District of Ohio criticized the contract-
based “blanket disqualification.”58
Under certain circumstances, it might be reasonable for an attorney or
his principal to communicate privileged or confidential matters to an
expert witness even in the absence of a formal contractual relationship.
On the other hand, there may be situations where, despite the existence
of a formal contractual relationship, so little of substance occurs during
the course of the relationship that neither the integrity of the trial
process, nor the interests of the party who retained the expert, would be
served by blanket disqualification.59
Although only a few courts have adopted the view that a
contractual relationship should exist to satisfy the first prong of the
disqualification test,60 courts—even those that reject the contract-
based “blanket disqualification”61 of experts—give significant
weight to a formal agreement.62
56 See Northbrook Digital LLC, 2009 WL 5908005, at *3 (denying
disqualification and finding that the moving party’s subjective belief that it was
disclosing confidential information to the expert was not enough to prove the existence
of a confidential relationship); Hewlett-Packard, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 1096 (denying
disqualification even though the moving party asserted that it believed that the expert
“would hold in confidence all of [their] discussions and not disclose them without [ ]
permission”); Lacroix, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 198 (denying disqualification even though it
was undisputed that the challenged expert “signed a Confidential Non-Disclosure
Agreement,” which provided that the expert “may have access to certain information
that may be confidential or proprietary in nature and that he agrees not to disclose or
use the information outside of [the instant] matters”).
57 See Paul, 123 F.R.D. at 277; Lacroix, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 200
(“[D]isqualification may not be warranted even if the expert witness has signed a
confidentiality agreement with the adversary.”).
58 Paul, 123 F.R.D. at 278.
59 Id.
60 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhône-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 CIV. 8833(RPP),
2000 WL 42202, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2000) (disqualifying an expert based on a
confidentiality agreement signed with the client and receipt of confidential information).
61 Id.
62 Rhodes v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 558 F. Supp. 2d 660, 667-68
(S.D.W. Va. 2008). In Rhodes, although the court did not apply the blanket
disqualification principle, it granted disqualification where the expert in question
signed a retention agreement that included a confidentiality clause. Id.; see Northbrook
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Beyond the existence of formal contractual relationships,
courts have also considered the following factors in evaluating
whether a confidential relationship exists: (1) whether the client
and expert had a long-standing relationship,63 (2) whether the
client and expert engaged in frequent contacts,64 (3) whether the
client intended to or has called the expert as a witness at trial,65
(4) whether an actual exchange of attorney work product
occurred,66 (5) “whether the expert was paid a fee,”67 (6) “whether
the expert was asked not to discuss the case with the opposing
parties or counsel,”68 and (7) “whether the expert derived any of
his specific ideas from work done under the direction of the
retaining party.”69 Problematically, some judges do not accord the
same weight to all of these factors, and some do not even list
which specific factors they consider when determining whether a
Digital LLC v. Vendio Services, Inc., No. 07–2250 (PJS/JJG), 2009 WL 5908005, at *2
(D. Minn. Aug. 26, 2009) (holding that the first prong of the disqualification test was
not satisfied where “[t]here is no written agreement, or even an informal letter, to
suggest that sensitive information was at stake”); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. EMC Corp.,
330 F. Supp. 2d. 1087, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Although the court in Hewlett-Packard
noted that disqualification of an expert “may not be warranted even if the expert
witness has signed a confidentiality agreement with the adversary,” it held that it was
objectively reasonable for a moving party to believe that it was in a confidential
relationship with the expert witness from the date that the expert signed a
confidentiality agreement until the date that the expert withdrew from the
engagement. Id. at 1094, 1096; see also Mayer v. Dell, 139 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1991)
(“Upon consideration of the first component of the two-step inquiry, the court finds that
it was not reasonable for plaintiff to conclude that a confidential relationship
existed . . . . [C]ounsel never proffered a confidentiality agreement for [the expert’s]
consideration nor sent a letter after their single meeting confirming any understanding
regarding confidentiality . . . .”).
63 Koch Ref. Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreaux MV, 85 F.3d 1178, 1182 (5th Cir.
1996); Northbrook Digital, 2009 WL 5908005, at *2; Rhodes, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 666
(citing Hewlett-Packard, 330 F. Supp. 2d. at 1093); Lacroix v. BIC Corp., 339 F. Supp.
2d 196, 201 (D. Mass. 2004) (finding the existence of a “significant” confidential
relationship between movant and client where the expert served as movant’s
consultant and as an expert witness for several years, but denying disqualification for
failure to satisfy the second prong of the test); Hewlett-Packard, 330 F. Supp. 2d. at
1097 (denying disqualification where the movant “has not explained how it could have
disclosed confidential detailed elements of its litigation strategy during such a short
conversation in which several patents were discussed”); Stencel v. Fairchild Corp., 174
F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
64 Rhodes, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 666 (citingHewlett Packard, 330 F. Supp. 2d. at 1093).
65 Id.; Stencel, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 1083.
66 Rhodes, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 667 (citingHewlett-Packard, 330F. Supp. 2d. at 1093).
67 Id.; see Stencel, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 1084 (“[T]he fact that any research or
resulting conclusions that [the expert] made would be paid for by Plaintiff also supports an
objectively reasonable expectation of confidentiality.”).
68 Hewlett-Packard, 330 F. Supp. 2d. at 1093.
69 Lacroix v. BIC Corp., 339 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200 (D. Mass. 2004).
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confidential relationship exists.70 Rather, some judges will simply
“imply a relationship of confidence when it is just to do so.”71
The judge does not need to determine whether the client
indeed retained the expert; the only question is whether a
confidential client-expert relationship existed—one that would
permit the client to reasonably expect that all communication
with the expert would be confidential.72 Several courts have
found “that a confidential relationship exists when the record
supports a longstanding series of interactions, which have more
likely than not coalesced to create a basic understanding of [the
retaining party’s] modus operandi, patterns of operations,
decision-making process, and the like.”73 Accordingly, in Koch
Refining Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreaux MV,74 the Fifth Circuit, in
upholding the disqualification of an expert, found that the first
prong of the disqualification test was satisfied where counsel
and the expert had a long-standing relationship that created a
reasonable expectation of confidentiality that continued even
after the expert was discharged.75
Conversely, where the exchange between the expert and
counsel only lasted several hours, courts are reluctant to find the
existence of a confidential relationship requiring disqualification.76
For instance, in Mayer v. Dell,77 a magistrate judge for the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia denied disqualification
where the movant and the expert had only one meeting, during
which the expert “was not retained, was not supplied with specific
data relevant to the case, and was not requested to perform any
services.”78 Where a reasonable expectation of confidentiality does
not exist (thus failing to satisfy the first prong of the
disqualification test), any disclosure of confidential or privileged
70 See, e.g., Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. Div. of Bldg. & Constr., Dep’t of
Treasury, 405 A.2d 487 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
71 See, e.g., id. at 492.
72 Hewlett-Packard, 330 F. Supp. 2d. at 1093; Shadow Traffic Network v.
Superior Court of L.A. Cty., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 693, 701 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
73 Rhodes v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 558 F. Supp. 2d 660, 667
(S.D.W. Va. 2008) (citing Koch Ref. Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreaux MV, 85 F.3d 1178,
1182 (5th Cir. 1996)).
74 Koch Ref. Co., 85 F.3d at 1178.
75 Id.
76 Palmer v. Ozbek, 144 F.R.D. 66, 67 (D. Md. 1992) (involving a single two-
hour consultation); Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271, 274 (S.D.
Ohio 1988) (involving a single meeting lasting one hour and fifteen minutes).
77 Mayer v. Dell, 139 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 1991).
78 Id. at 3.
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information “is essentially a waiver of any existing privilege.”79
The lack of clarity and uniformity among courts—in addition to
the absence of statutory guidance—in defining what constitutes
an objectively reasonable belief that a confidential relationship
exists contributes to erroneous decisionmaking by attorneys and
experts. This is particularly so since counsel and experts alike do
not, and arguably cannot, appreciate the consequences of their
decisions. Thus, clients and attorneys who mistakenly believe
that they are in a confidential relationship with an expert, and
who choose to disclose confidential or privileged information to
the expert based on this flawed assumption, inadvertently waive
the right to prevent the expert from using such information to the
detriment of the client.
B. Disclosure of Confidential Information to the Expert
When a client hires an expert to testify, the expert may be
privy to the client’s confidential information and attorney work
product.80 Additionally, experts may have an opportunity to
observe counsel’s “mental impressions, opinions and legal theories”
of the case.81 There are two major sources of disagreement between
the courts in determining whether confidential or privileged
information was disclosed to the expert, which is the second prong
of the disqualification test. First, judges disagree drastically on the
definition of “confidential information.” Second, they disagree about
whether the information disclosed to the expert in a previous case
must sufficiently relate to the subject matter of the case at issue.
1. Courts Do Not Conform to a Single Definition of
Confidential Information
In analyzing the second prong of the expert disqualification
test, disclosure of privileged or confidential information, courts
have clashed over the definition of what constitutes confidential
information and to what extent the disclosure—or potential for
disclosure—warrants disqualification.82 Some courts have simply
79 Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (E.D. Va. 1991); see
also English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden Labs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498, 1504 (D. Colo. 1993)
(denying disqualification where the moving party implicitly waived its confidentiality).
80 Eckstein & Nyffeler, supra note 15, at 4.
81 Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. Div. of Bldg. & Constr., Dep’t of Treasury, 405
A.2d 487, 492 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
82 See infra Section II.B.2.
2016] NEW RULES OF WAR 747
not defined the term.83 By merely asking whether any confidential
or privileged information was disclosed to the expert, without
offering a definition, these courts create precedent that offers
little guidance to future courts deciding the issue.
Most trial courts have defined confidential information as
“information ‘of either particular significance or . . . which can be
readily identified as either attorney work product or within the
scope of the attorney-client privilege.’”84 Under the majority view,
unless the disclosed information meets this stringent standard,
courts will deny a motion to disqualify an expert.85 Other courts
have held that information that is public or that will be
disseminated to the adverse party through mandatory disclosures
or discovery will not constitute confidential information for the
purposes of the disqualification test’s second prong.86 Furthermore,
others have noted that communication about technical matters,
as opposed to legal ones, will fall outside the purview of
confidential information.87
The Western District of New York has adopted
another definition of “confidential information”: “[s]pecific and
unambiguous disclosures that if revealed would prejudice the
party.”88 But determining what constitutes an “unambiguous
disclosure[ ] ”89 is anything but unambiguous in practice.
Judges have incorporated numerous factors in forming
their definition of confidential information, including whether
counsel and expert have discussed, inter alia, (1) litigation
strategy or a theory of the case,90 (2) the moving party’s views on
83 See, e.g., Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp., 734 F.
Supp. 334, 338 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
84 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. EMC Corp., 330 F. Supp. 2d. 1087, 1094 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (quoting Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271, 279 (S.D. Ohio 1988)).
85 Paul, 123 F.R.D. at 279 (denying a motion to disqualify the expert where
there was a “lack of communication of any information [to the expert] . . . which can be
readily identified as either attorney work product or within the scope of the attorney-
client privilege”).
86 Chrisjulbrian Co. v. Upper St. Rose Fleeting Co., No. Civ. A. 93-1879, 1994
WL 673440, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 2, 1994) (holding that the moving party did not satisfy
its burden of proving a confidential relationship with the expert where the information
disclosed to the expert was discoverable pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26); Palmer v. Ozbek, 144 F.R.D. 66, 68 (D. Md. 1992); see also Brian Burke,
Disqualifying an Opponent’s Expert When the Expert Is Your Client’s Former Employee,
66 DEF. COUNS. J. 69, 72 (1999) (citing English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden Labs., Inc., 833
F. Supp. 1498, (D. Colo. 1993)).
87 Nikkal Indus., Ltd. v. Salton, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 187, 191-92
(S.D.N.Y.1988).
88 Gordon v. Kaleida Health, No. 08-CV-378S(F), 2013 WL 2250506, at *5
(W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013) (emphasis added).
89 Id.
90 Rhodes v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 558 F. Supp. 2d 660, 666
(S.D.W. Va. 2008) (citing Koch Ref. Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreaux MV, 85 F.3d 1178,
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each side’s strengths and weaknesses,91 (3) the types of witnesses
the moving party expects to retain92 and the roles of such
witnesses,93 (4) approach to discovery,94 (5) potential defenses,95
and (6) counsel’s mental impressions.96 The disagreement on an
applicable standard regarding the definition of confidential
information, however, is not the only layer of debate surrounding
the disqualification test’s second prong.
2. Courts Disagree on Whether Confidential
Information Must Sufficiently Relate to the Subject
Matter of Litigation
Although courts diverge in their definition of confidential
information, they agree that confidential or privileged information
must be disclosed to the expert to warrant disqualification. For
instance, courts in the Northern District of Illinois have been
adamant that nothing short of actual disclosure of confidential
information to the expert would satisfy the second prong of the
expert disqualification test. The court first announced this
position in Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Harnischfeger
Corp.,97 in which it expressly declined to find that existence of a
confidential relationship would create a presumption that
disclosures of confidential information were made to the expert.98
The court further noted that such a presumption exists in the
1181 (5th Cir. 1996)); Cordy v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 156 F.R.D. 575, 581 (D.N.J.
1994) (disqualifying an expert where the expert conceded that he was told the theory of
the case); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 184 F.R.D. 410, 414 (D. Utah 1999)
(denying disqualification where “no strategic thoughts or impressions of counsel were
communicated” to the expert); Palmer, 144 F.R.D. at 67; Mitchell v. Wilmore, 981 P.2d
172, 174 (Colo. 1999).
91 Rhodes, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 666 (citing Koch Ref. Co., 85 F.3d at 1181).
92 Id. at 667.
93 Koch Ref. Co., 85 F.3d at 1182 (citing Mayer v. Dell, 139 F.R.D. 1, 4
(D.D.C. 1991)).
94 Mitchell, 981 P.2d at 174.
95 Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246, 1249 (E.D. Va. 1991)
(disqualifying an expert where it was indisputable that the expert received confidential
work product, and noting that a memorandum detailing potential defenses was one of the
“clearest examples” of confidential information that satisfies the second prong of the
disqualification test); Rhodes, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 667 (citing Koch Ref. Co., 85 F.3d at 1181).
96 Mitchell, 981 P.2d at 174; Turner v. Thiel, 553 S.E.2d 765, 768 (Va. 2001)
(granting motion for disqualification where client disclosed “mental impressions and
trial strategies” to the expert). But see Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Interlogix, Inc., No. 01
C 6157, 2002 WL 653893, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 2002) (analyzing the first prong of the
disqualification test and noting that “an attorney’s mental impressions communicated
to a [testifying] expert are not protected by the work-product doctrine”).
97 Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp., 734 F. Supp. 334
(N.D. Ill. 1990).
98 Id. at 337-38; see Northbrook Digital LLC v. Vendio Servs., Inc., No. 07-
2250 (PJS/JJG), 2009 WL 5908005, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 26, 2009).
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attorney disqualification analysis and does not belong in the
expert disqualification context.99 Over a decade later, the court in
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Interlogix, Inc.,100 reiterated this
position. Denying a motion to disqualify an expert, the court held
that “[a]n expert cannot be disqualified without evidence that
privileged or confidential information was received by the expert
during the relationship.”101 The court posited that this strict
standard prevents attorneys from engaging in gamesmanship by
forming a confidential relationship with an expert solely to
preclude the opponent’s retention of that expert.102
While a majority of courts agree that to warrant
disqualification, confidential or privileged information must have
been disclosed to the expert, a minority of courts have required
that “[t]he confidential information must also be sufficiently related
to the instant litigation to merit disqualification.”103 For instance, in
Bone Care International, LLC v. Pentech Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the
district court held that the moving party, who bears a high burden
of proof, must establish that confidential information was disclosed
and that there was an “overlap between the technical subject
matter of the litigations” in order to warrant disqualification.104
Other courts, however, have neglected to consider whether the
subject matter of the lawsuit in question is sufficiently related to
the disclosed confidential information to warrant disqualification.105
Problematically, other judges have expressly rejected this
additional step. For example, a U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia has specified that once the judge determines
99 Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 734 F. Supp. at 338.
100 Chamberlain Grp. Inc. v. Interlogix, Inc., No. 01 C 6157, 2002 WL 653893
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 2002).
101 Id. at *3. But see Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 734 F. Supp. 334, where
although the judge agreed that confidential information must be disclosed to warrant
disqualification, he nonetheless asked whether “a relationship between the experts pose[d] a
significant risk of such disclosure and resulting prejudice.” Id. at 339 (emphasis added).
102 Chamberlain Grp., 2002 WL 653893, at *3 (citing Wang Labs. Inc. v. Toshiba
Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (E.D. Va. 1991)); see also United States ex rel. Cherry Hill
Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Healthcare Rehab Sys. Inc., 994 F. Supp. 244, 251 (D.N.J. 1997)
(denying motion to disqualify expert based on inferences that confidential information
could have been passed from client to expert).
103 Rhodes v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 558 F. Supp. 2d 660, 667
(S.D.W. Va. 2008) (citing Cherry Hill Convalescent Ctr., Inc., 994 F. Supp. at 251); see
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. EMC Corp., 330 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
104 Bone Care Int’l, LLC v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., No. 08 c 1083, 2009 WL
249386, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2009).
105 See id. (denying disqualification); Atlantic City Assocs., LLC v. Carter &
Burgess Consultants, Inc., No. 05-3227(NLH), 2007 WL 63992, at *1-2 (D.N.J. Jan. 5,
2007) (denying disqualification of an expert retained by opposing clients in different
cases because the court found that the subject matter of the cases was substantially
unrelated and no confidential information was exchanged).
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that there were disclosures of work product, “the value of the
disclosures” is irrelevant.106
Not considering the relatedness of previously disclosed
information makes little sense, given how courts generally treat
conflicts of interest for attorneys. In the attorney disqualification
test, a lawyer who represented a client in a lawsuit is forbidden—
absent informed consent—from representing another client “in the
same or a substantially related matter.”107 Although logic dictates
that courts should similarly scrutinize the interrelatedness of
such cases in determining whether to disqualify an expert, such
an analysis does not neatly fit into the traditional expert
disqualification test. As a result, judges often do not consider this
factor in the expert disqualification analysis. Introducing this
level of analysis could lead to the preclusion of experts from
testifying in certain cases. At least one court has stated that
preventing experts from pursuing their professional calling
merely because the expert at one time represented an adverse
party “would be both unintended and undesirable since in the
ordinary situation an expert can remain fully loyal to his client
without affecting the rights of other clients.”108 But where the
matters being litigated are significantly similar, the potential for
abuse of confidential information is magnified and therefore
justifies limiting an expert’s ability to testify.
Judges that have scrutinized the relatedness of cases in
which the expert has testified on behalf of adverse parties have
generally declined to disqualify experts when the subject matter
of the information disclosed in the previous case does not
sufficiently relate to the present dispute.109 The court in Lacroix v.
BIC Corp. denied disqualification where it was clear that the
expert was not exposed to confidential information relevant to the
106 Wang Labs., Inc., 762 F. Supp. at 1249.
107 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
Matters are “substantially related” for purposes of this Rule if they involve
the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial
risk that confidential factual information as would normally have been
obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the client’s
position in the subsequent matter.
Id. r. 1.9 cmt. 3.
108 Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. Div. of Bldg. & Constr., Dep’t of Treasury, 405
A.2d 487, 492 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
109 See, e.g., Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Indus., Inc., No. CIV. A. 94-
CV-0752, 1995 WL 376471, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 1995) (denying disqualification
where the expert’s former retention did not relate to the challenged action); Paul v.
Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271, 279 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (denying
disqualification where “the parties never communicated on matters of particular
substance relating to the . . . case”).
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case at issue.110 This court applied the two-prong disqualification
test and under the second prong evaluated whether the
confidential information discussed with the expert sufficiently
related to the subject matter of the case in question. In Lacroix,
BIC Corp., a corporation that manufactured lighters, among other
things,111 hired an expert witness in fire dynamics and disclosed
to the expert confidential information relating to BIC’s lighter
manufacturing process.112 Several years after this engagement,
another client hired the expert to testify in a personal injury
case—unrelated to the prior case against BIC—stemming from
the alleged explosion of a BIC lighter.113 Relying on the
confidentiality agreement that the expert previously signed with
BIC, the corporation moved to enjoin the expert from testifying
against BIC in the instant litigation. The district court denied
disqualification, noting that it was “undisputed that the parties
never communicated on matters of any substance relating to the
specifics of this case,” and the information that BIC disclosed to
the expert during their former engagement was not “specific to the
current litigation.”114 The court acknowledged that where the
former client discloses to the expert confidential information
unrelated to the subject matter of the instant litigation, the former
client is not prejudiced, because the former client’s adversary will
not be able to use such unrelated information to its benefit or to the
former client’s detriment. This additional inquiry under the
second prong of the disqualification test recognizes the practical
implications of disclosure: if the client’s disclosed information is
irrelevant to the litigation in question, the opposing side cannot
use the information to the client’s detriment. There is simply no
prejudice to the former client if the information cannot be used to
harm the former client’s interests.
Along the same line of reasoning, the court in Bone Care
International, LLC concluded that having the same expert
testify both for and against the same company in different trials
was permissible, despite the apparent conflict, because the
patented technologies that were at issue in the previous case
involved different patents and underlying technologies.115 The
110 Lacroix v. BIC Corp., 339 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201 (D. Mass. 2004).
111 Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disqualify Plaintiff ’s
Expert, Lacroix v. BIC Corp., 339 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201 (D. Mass. 2004) (No. 02-40037-
CBS), 2004 WL 5316225.
112 Lacroix, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 198.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 201.
115 Bone Care Int’l, LLC v. Pentech Pharm. Inc., No. 08 c 1083, 2009 WL
249386, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2009). In Bone Care International, LLC, the patent at
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court posited that had the disclosed information related to the
same particular patent at issue, or the same underlying
technology, the outcome of the disqualification motion would
have been different.116 The court reasoned that although the
expert was exposed to his former client’s confidential
information, the former client would not be disadvantaged,
because the two lawsuits were substantially unrelated.
Unlike Bone Care International, LLC, in which the subject
matter of the cases involved substantially different patents with
different underlying technologies, the court in Rhodes v. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co.117 disqualified an expert who was retained
by adverse parties to testify in different cases, because the subject
matter of the two cases involved the very same chemical that
allegedly contaminated the water supply of the plaintiffs in both
suits.118 Since both cases involved the same tort claims against the
defendants, and the expert was to render an opinion on a
particular chemical’s toxicity to humans, the district court found
that the issues were so “intertwined”119 that these two cases were
essentially one and the same, and disqualification was required to
preserve judicial integrity.120
Federal courts are not the only ones that have inquired
into the relatedness of subject matter. The Superior Court of New
Jersey held in Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. Division of Building and
Construction121 that where the subject matter of litigation is
substantially related, “the potential abuse of its former client’s
confidences and [the expert’s] own inability to render [his current
client] an objective expert report [makes participation] both
legally and morally impossible.”122 In Conforti & Eisele, Inc., the
defendant retained an expert for its defense in a case involving an
issue in the first case related to “steroid-containing pharmaceutical compositions for
treating scalp psoriasis,” while the patent in question in the second case related to “a
method of treating hyperparathyroidism.” Id. at *3; see also Viskase Corp. v. W.R.
Grace & Co.-Conn., No. 90 C 7515, 1992 WL 13679, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 1992)
(denying motion to disqualify an expert who “had no involvement with the resins or
patents directly at issue in this case [and] . . . no experience specific to the products or
patents in suit”); Greene, Tweed of Del., Inc. v. DuPont Dow Elastomers, L.L.C., 202
F.R.D. 426, 430 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (refusing to disqualify an expert where the “documents
[did] not show that he was privy to confidential information relevant to the alleged
infringing products in this case”).
116 Bone Care Int’l, LLC, 2009 WL 249386, at *2.
117 Rhodes v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours &Co., 558 F. Supp. 2d 660 (S.D.W. Va. 2008).
118 See supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text.
119 Rhodes, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 670.
120 Id. at 671.
121 Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. Div. of Bldg. & Constr., Dep’t of Treasury, 405
A.2d 487, 492 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
122 Id.
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early phase of a multiphase construction project.123 The plaintiff
then hired the same expert to testify in a suit involving the later
phases of the same project.124 The court disqualified the expert on
the premise that the expert could be consciously or unconsciously
affected by his prior service to the defendant.125 Although the
defendant only retained the expert to testify about the construction
project’s earlier phases, the defendant provided the expert with
confidential information relating to the later phase of the
project—the subject matter of the litigation in question. Since, in
the first case, the defendant provided the expert with information
that easily could be used by the plaintiff (the expert’s new
employer) against the defendant in the second case, the risk of
prejudice was significant.
The inquiry into the relatedness of the subject matter of the
former case and the case in question promotes fairness in expert
disqualification decisions and further aligns the disqualification
test with its purpose—to prevent unauthorized disclosure of a
client’s confidential information to the detriment of that client.
Furthermore, this inquiry—unlike the balancing of public policy
considerations126—does not replace the requirements of the
disqualification test’s two prongs. Unless during a confidential
relationship, the client actually disclosed confidential information
to the expert, the relatedness of the cases’ subject matter,
regardless of how overwhelming it may be, will not warrant
disqualification. For instance, in English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden
Laboratories, Inc.,127 although the subject matter of the lawsuits
involved a similar piece of equipment, the district court did not
disqualify the expert. The court held that because the information
disclosed to the expert was also disclosed to the public, it was not
confidential and thus did not satisfy the test’s second prong.128 This
additional inquiry provides much-needed clarity to the
disqualification test and serves the purpose of the test, which is to
prevent exploitation of clients’ confidential information.
As the review of the relevant case law demonstrates,
courts have not applied the traditional two-prong test
consistently. Courts cannot even agree on what constitutes
123 Id. at 488.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 492. Although the different phases of construction involved
independent buildings, “all phases were interrelated.” Id.
126 See infra Section II.A.
127 English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden Labs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498 (D. Colo. 1993).
128 See Brian Burke, Disqualifying an Opponent’s Expert When the Expert is
Your Client’s Former Employee, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 69, 72 (1999) (discussing English
Feedlot, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498).
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“confidential information,” let alone on when experts’ exposure
to that information should lead to disqualification. The next part
explores more fully the consequences that have resulted from
courts exercising their inherent judicial authority to disqualify
experts. This discretion, lacking the guidance of any statute or
rule, has led to unpredictable application of the law. And
unpredictability in the law leads to higher costs to litigants as
they attempt to retain experts in their cases.
II. THE LACK OF AWORKABLE STANDARD TO RESOLVE
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AMONG EXPERTS
Federal and state courts are vested with the inherent
authority to disqualify experts and attorneys.129 This authority
“derives from the court’s ‘judicial duty to protect the integrity
of the legal process’”130 and serves to “preserve the public
confidence in the fairness and integrity of the judicial
proce[ss].”131 The disqualification test for experts, unlike that
for attorneys,132 is not codified in federal or state statutes, nor
is it found in procedural rules governing civil litigation.133
There are also no guiding principles in the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, which apply to attorneys, or in their
state equivalents. Additionally, experts are rarely subject to
ethical codes of conduct in their professions.134 Ethics standards
for most industries are either nonexistent, or where they do
exist, are not binding and “are often politely disregarded” by
experts in the field.135 Thus, the only protection that litigants
129 Coffey, supra note 36, at 196-97; In re Ambassador Grp., Inc., Litig., 879 F.
Supp. 237, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
130 In re Ambassador Grp., Inc., Litig., 879 F. Supp. at 241 (quoting Wang Labs,
Inc. v. Toshiba Corp. 762 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (E.D. Va. 1991)); see Gordon v. Kaleida
Health, No. 08-CV-378S(F), 2013 WL 2250506, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013) (citing
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kyocera Corp., No. 10-CV-6334 CJS, 2012 WL 4103811, at *7
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2012)); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp., 734
F. Supp. 334, 336 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
131 Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271, 278 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
132 MODELRULESOFPROF’LCONDUCT r. 1.7, r. 1.9, r. 1.10 cmt. (AM. BARASS’N2013).
133 Coffey, supra note 36, at 197 n.6 (“[C]onflicts of interest based on prior
services or contracts are not directly addressed in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure . . . .”).
134 Edward K. Cheng, Same Old, Same Old: Scientific Evidence Past and
Present, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1387, 1399 (2006) (noting that only 7 out of 36 specialty
organizations surveyed had established ethical provisions governing expert witnesses
(citing Aubrey Milunsky, Lies, Damned Lies, and Medical Experts: The Abrogation of
Responsibility by Specialty Organizations and a Call for Action, 18 J. CHILD
NEUROLOGY 413, 416 (2003))).
135 Coffey, supra note 36, at 196 n.5 (citing Terry O’Reilly, Ethics and Experts,
59 J. AIR L. & COM. 113, 114 (1993)).
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have in ensuring that an expert does not use their own
confidential information against them is the discretion of the
trial court judge.
Although judges appreciate the need to regulate the
conduct of expert witnesses,136 federal and state courts alike do
not have comprehensive rules on expert disqualification and
further lack “extensive case law”137 to guide them. Although the
two-prong test announced in Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods
Co.138 has been widely accepted as the traditional disqualification
test, subsequent trial courts’ interpretations of this test have
created numerous variations—in some jurisdictions, making the
disqualification test almost unrecognizable as the one announced
in Paul. Discord between federal and state judges in analyzing
the disqualification test should be resolved with a comprehensive
expert disqualification test to govern conflicts of interest.
A. The Expert Disqualification Test: Two or Three Prongs?
In determining whether an expert’s conduct warrants
disqualification, several jurisdictions have added a third prong to
the traditional two-prong test. The traditional test asks whether
it was objectively reasonable to conclude that a confidential
relationship existed between the client and the expert and
whether confidential information was indeed disclosed to the
expert. Courts that have adopted a three-prong approach first
determine whether the traditional two prongs have been fulfilled
and then proceed to a third step. Following the traditional
inquiry, this added third step further requires judges to “balance
the competing policy objectives in determining expert
disqualification.”139 In applying this prong, judges have drastically
disagreed on how to balance competing public policy
considerations. First, courts disagree on whether the applicable
disqualification standard is the traditional two-prong test that is
136 The question of how to best regulate expert witnesses has been asked for
over a century. Consider the remarks of Judge Learned Hand: “No one will deny that
the law should in some way effectively use expert knowledge wherever it will aid in
settling disputes. The only question is as to how it can do so best.” Learned Hand,
Expert Testimony, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding, 15 HARV. L. REV.
40, 40 (1901); see also Rhodes v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 558 F. Supp. 2d 660,
666 (S.D.W. Va. 2008) (“Given the ever-growing significance of expert witnesses,
clarification of the proper standard is needed.”); Austin v. Am. Ass’n of Neurological
Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967, 973 (7th Cir. 2001) (“More policing of expert witnessing is
required, not less.”).
137 Coffey, supra note 36, at 197; see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
138 Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
139 Cordy v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 156 F.R.D. 575, 580 (D.N.J. 1994).
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exclusive of public policy considerations or whether it is the three-
prong test that considers public policy.140 Second, those courts that
have adopted the three-prong test do not agree about which public
policy interests should be evaluated, and they further convolute
the analysis by only balancing public policy factors (i.e., the third
prong) under certain circumstances.
Courts that adopt the three-prong test have considered
many public policy factors. Some examples include (1) any
prejudice that might occur to either party if an expert is
disqualified,141 (2) the appearance of a conflict of interest or
impropriety,142 (3) the burden associated with obtaining a
replacement expert,143 (4) the availability of another expert
possessing relevant specialized expertise,144 (5) the importance of
allowing experts to pursue their profession,145 and (6) whether
counsel has formed a relationship with an expert solely to prevent
the adverse party from using that expert.146 Despite the existence
140 See infra Section II.B.
141 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 184 F.R.D. 410, 414 (D. Utah 1999)
(“Examination for some legitimate claim of prejudice to the party seeking
disqualification of the expert from trial is appropriate.”); Stencel v. Fairchild Corp., 174
F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
142 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. EMC Corp., 330 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1093, 1095 (N.D.
Cal. 2004).
143 See id. at 1095 (“Consideration of prejudice is especially appropriate at late
stages in the litigation, at which time disqualification is more likely to disrupt the
judicial proceedings.”); United States ex rel. Cherry Hill Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v.
Healthcare Rehab Sys., Inc., 994 F. Supp. 244, 251 (D.N.J. 1997); Michelson v. Merrill
Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 83 CIV. 8898 (MEL), 1989 WL 31514, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1989) (granting disqualification where ample “time
remain[ed] . . . to find and prepare a new expert” in lieu of the disqualified expert).
144 English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden Labs., 833 F. Supp. 1498, 1505 (D. Colo. 1993).
145 Id.; Hewlett-Packard, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 1098 (denying disqualification,
noting that disqualification “would impair [the expert’s] interest in pursuing his trade
as an expert witness”).
146 Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271, 280-81 (S.D. Ohio 1988);
Hewlett-Packard, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 1098 (denying disqualification, stating that
“[p]ermitting one party to lock up all or most of the best experts might interfere with the
proper interpretation of claim language—a task that potentially has preclusive effect with
respect to future litigation—as well as fair evaluation of the merits of claims of
infringement”); see alsoWang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246, 1249 n.6 (E.D.
Va. 1991) (disqualifying an expert after applying the traditional two-prong disqualification
test, but noting that “[w]ere there evidence of misconduct or abuse of the process a different
result might obtain”). Without labeling this a public policy consideration, the court further
expressed this concern:
[L]awyers could . . . disable potentially troublesome experts merely by retaining
them, without intending to use them as consultants. Lawyers using this ploy are
not seeking expert help with their case; instead, they are attempting only to
prevent opposing lawyers from obtaining an expert. This is not a legitimate use of
experts, and courts should not countenance it by employing the disqualification
sanction in aid of it.
Wang Labs., Inc., 762 F. Supp. at 1248.
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of these various factors, many courts do not disclose which factors
they considered in deciding whether to disqualify an expert, and
they thus fail to provide attorneys, clients, and experts with any
notice of the criteria being used to determine whether and under
what circumstances disqualification is warranted.
A major obstacle to achieving consistency in this area
stems from disagreement among judges on whether to apply the
traditional two-prong test or a three-prong test that is inclusive of
public policy considerations. There is even disagreement among
the courts that apply the same approach. Specifically, courts that
utilize the three-prong test disagree on the order in which to
apply the three prongs of the test. While some courts will only
apply the balancing prong after determining that the first two
inquiries—whether a confidential relationship existed and
whether confidential or privileged information was exchanged—
are answered in the affirmative, others intertwine policy
considerations into the analysis of the first two questions.147
Judges who use the latter approach and combine public policy
considerations into their analysis of the traditional two prongs
place great emphasis on the practical policy considerations. Some
judges even permit such considerations to supersede the traditional
inquiry into the existence of a confidential relationship and
exchange of confidential information. Significantly, some courts’
reliance on public policy factors has rendered the traditional
disqualification test practically useless, as the heightened focus
on public policy trumps the other considerations. This provides
attorneys, litigants, and experts with little guidance on what
conduct will warrant disqualification, making it nearly impossible
to determine in advance if an expert might be disqualified.
B. Demystifying Public Policy Considerations
The balancing prong of the three-prong disqualification
test fails to provide guidance to state and federal judges because
courts across jurisdictions neither agree nor specify the public
policy factors to balance in determining whether to disqualify an
expert. The dissonance among judges regarding the general
application of the disqualification test, combined with confusion
147 Hewlett-Packard, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 1093 (“In addition to these two factors
[the two-prong disqualification test], the Court also should consider whether
disqualification would be fair to the affected party and would promote the integrity of
the legal process.” (emphasis added)). It is clear from the court’s reference to the prongs
of the expert disqualification test as factors that the court gave equal, if not greater,
weight to the public policy considerations.
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regarding which policy factors should apply, further underscores
the need for a uniform disqualification test. Ambiguity stemming
from the use of public policy considerations in the expert
disqualification analysis is further magnified when judges
combine several independent policy considerations under the
umbrella term “fundamental unfairness.”148
For example, in Gordon v. Kaleida Health,149 the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of New York summarized
the third, balancing prong for disqualification as follows:
Disqualification of an expert . . . is justified by the need to avoid the
“risk of prejudice from possible disclosure and use of confidential
client communications” and the fundamental unfairness that would
arise if “an expert hired by a party, who at that party’s expense
obtains specific knowledge and expertise in the issues involved in the
litigation, [were permitted] to then be hired by the opposing party
and allow the opposing party to reap the benefits of that work.”150
Judges often use the terms “fundamental unfairness” and
“prejudice” as fillers in opinions that otherwise do not provide
guidance about what factors they consider. Although such terms
are meaningful when resolving certain legal matters,151 they are
neither consequential nor useful in setting precedent on expert
disqualification, since vague notions of fundamental fairness do
not provide meaningful direction for future courts. Additionally,
the weight of any individual factor cannot be quantified because
judges often do not provide guidance when they favor one public
policy over another. For example, in Paul v. Rawlings Sporting
Goods Co.,152 the court merely inquired whether, “under any set of
circumstances,”153 the court could disqualify the expert. The
balancing prong of this test contributes to inconsistent and often
contradictory precedent. Certain public policy factors, including
the burden associated with replacing a disqualified expert and the
148 Lacroix v. BIC Corp., 339 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200 (D. Mass. 2004) (“In analyzing
the disqualification issue, the court also balances competing policy objectives and considers
concerns of fundamental fairness.”); Gordon v. Kaleida Health, No. 08-CV-378S(F), 2013 WL
2250506, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013); Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. Div. of Bldg. & Constr.,
Dep’t of Treasury, 405 A.2d 487, 491-92 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
149 Gordon, 2013 WL 2250506.
150 Id. at *6 (quoting Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp.,
734 F. Supp. 334, 336 (N.D. Ill. 1990)) (emphasis added).
151 Federal Rule of Evidence 403 allows judges, as gatekeepers of evidence, to
exclude relevant evidence where “the probative value is substantially outweighed by a
danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” In deciding substantive matters, including the
disqualification of experts, however, the inquiry is immensely more complex than the
balancing of prejudice and probative value.
152 Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
153 Id. at 277.
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appearance of impropriety, have received particular attention in
the expert disqualification debate.
1. The Burden of Finding a Replacement Expert
Some judges, in refusing to disqualify expert witnesses,
have emphasized the prejudice to and burden on the nonmoving
party in having to find and retain a replacement expert upon
disqualification.154 Courts are generally reluctant to grant
disqualification when an expert possesses particularly specialized
knowledge or when an expert is nationally recognized in his or
her chosen field, because this would create a particularly
significant burden for the nonmoving party.155 But in areas of
common expertise, such as medicine, engineering, and business,156
“lawyers have unparalleled power to select their expert witnesses
from a large pool.”157 This lowers the burden associated with
finding a replacement witness and increases the chances that the
court will disqualify an expert witness.158
Other courts have rejected the notion that they should
consider the burden and expense to the nonmoving party of
acquiring a replacement expert. For example, in Michelson v.
Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York granted a defendant’s
motion to disqualify an expert, even though the plaintiff
contended that he spent hundreds of hours with the expert and
could not afford to find an adequate replacement.159 The court
held that disqualification was warranted due to a sufficient
possibility that the expert could compromise the trial by providing
his new client with his former client’s confidential information.160
154 See English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden Labs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498 (D. Colo.
1993); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 734 F. Supp. 334.
155 Palmer v. Ozbek, 144 F.R.D. 66, 67 n.3 (D. Md. 1992) (in denying
disqualification, the court specifically noted that the expert in question “is a nationally
recognized expert on the psychological needs and characteristics of hearing impaired
children”); cf. Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. Div. of Bldg. & Constr., Dep’t of Treasury, 405
A.2d 487, 488 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) (granting disqualification of the expert
witness even though the expert’s testimony “involve[d] highly technical matters in the
field of civil engineering and construction”).
156 Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1119 (1991).
157 LEMPERT ET AL., supra note 16, at 1128.
158 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhône-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 CIV. 8833
(RPP), 2000 WL 42202, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2000) (disqualifying an expert, noting
that it was “not shown that there are no[ ] other experts in the treatment of ovarian
cancer available to testify”).
159 Michelson v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 83-cv-8898
(MEL), 1989 WL 31514, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1989).
160 Id.
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The court determined that the hardship on the nonmoving party
to replace the expert did not outweigh the risk that the expert
would “be subconsciously affected” by the confidential information
received from the former client.161 Similarly, in Conforti & Eisele,
Inc., the court balanced the expert’s “right to pursue [his]
professional calling and the economic hardship [he] would suffer” if
disqualified against the need to protect the former client’s
confidences from exposure to “his adversary.”162 It ultimately held
that the expert’s “interest is comparatively weak.”163 The subjective
nature of this policy inquiry breeds unpredictability in judicial
decisionmaking and offers little insight to litigants, experts, and
future courts as to what public policies should be considered under
the disqualification test.
2. The Appearance of Impropriety
Another area of disagreement among courts is the use of
the “appearance of impropriety” factor when balancing public
policy interests under the alternative three-prong test. Courts
that adopt the traditional two-prong disqualification test do not
consider the “appearance of impropriety” as a viable factor in the
analysis. But courts that adhere to the third prong’s balancing act
heavily consider the appearance of impropriety as a factor in favor
of disqualification, on the premise that even a mere appearance of
impropriety threatens the public’s trust in the judicial process. In
Michelson, the court disqualified an expert retained by adverse
parties, because allowing the expert to testify “would at best
create an appearance of impropriety and at worst compromise the
proceeding by providing plaintiff with confidential information.”164
Although there was no evidence to indicate that the expert ever
received confidential information or disclosed any confidences,165
the court nonetheless disqualified the expert, noting that
permitting the expert to testify would seem improper and would
leave the former client vulnerable to “a potential future breach” of
that client’s confidentiality.166
In the context of attorney disqualification for conflicts of
interest, however, many courts have disqualified attorneys due to
161 Id.
162 Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. Div. of Bldg. & Constr., Dep’t of Treasury, 405
A.2d 487, 489-90 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
163 Id.
164 Michelson, 1989 WL 31514, at *5.
165 Id. at *4.
166 Id.
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the mere appearance of impropriety.167 In such cases, courts have
not considered whether the attorney actually received confidential
information from the former client.168 Rather, courts have found
that “[t]he appearance of impropriety is enough to foster the
disqualification of an attorney”169 and “requires prompt remedial
action by the court.”170 For expert disqualification, however, most
judges ask for more, requiring that other public policy factors favor
disqualification in addition to the appearance of impropriety.171
C. Courts Erroneously Apply the Attorney Disqualification
Test to Experts
Courts have the authority to disqualify attorneys and
experts alike,172 but the disqualification tests governing attorneys
and experts are not one and the same. The two tests do not
follow the same analysis and do not conform to the same
principles, as the roles of experts and attorneys in our legal
system are drastically different. While nearly all federal and
state courts have adopted the traditional expert disqualification
test, a select few have further convoluted the standard for expert
disqualification by adopting a different approach: applying the
attorney disqualification test in the realm of expert witness
disqualification. This alternative approach is in direct contrast
with the two-prong expert disqualification test and further
diverges from a uniform application of the traditional test.
In Conforti & Eisele, Inc.,173 the court disqualified an
expert by applying the attorney-client privilege to the expert
167 Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 565, 575 (2d Cir. 1973);
Oswall v. Tekni-Plex, Inc., 691 A.2d 889, 893 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
168 Emle Indus., Inc., 478 F.2d at 571.
169 Oswall, 691 A.2d at 893.
170 Emle Indus., Inc., 478 F.2d at 565.
171 United States v. Ta, 938 F. Supp. 762, 765 (D. Utah 1996) (stating “mere
appearance of impropriety is not sufficient for disqualification”); Gleason v. Zocco, 941
F. Supp. 32, 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that unusual circumstances must exist to
disqualify based solely on appearance of impropriety); Parkland Corp. v. Maxximum
Co., 920 F. Supp. 1088, 1093-94 (D. Idaho 1996) (finding a possible breach of confidence
and the need to minimize the appearance of impropriety are compelling factors in
disqualification decisions); In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 470 F. Supp. 495,
507 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (stating that the court will not base a disqualification decision
solely on the basis of the appearance of impropriety); Arizona v. Sustaita, 902 P.2d
1344, 1347 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (requiring more than a showing of the appearance of
impropriety).
172 Coffey, supra note 36, at 196-97; In re Ambassador Grp., Inc., Litig., 879 F.
Supp. 237, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
173 Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. Div. of Bldg. and Constr., Dep’t of the Treasury,
405 A.2d 487 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
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witness.174 The court focused its analysis on the principle that
attorneys are mandated to take reasonable precautions to
safeguard their clients’ confidential information from disclosure
and held that extension of the attorney-client privilege was
necessary to “uphold this duty.”175 In issuing an injunction to
prevent the expert from testifying against his former client, the
court stated that
[i]t would be anomalous to hold that the [client] could claim the
privilege as against its attorneys, yet have that privilege dissolve
when their attorneys properly confide their . . . communication to
someone in their employ. The client is the holder of the privilege and
should be entitled to demand the silence of any party in his employ
who could disclose what he reveal[s] in confidence.176
Similarly, inMarvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. Norton Co.,177
the district court applied the stringent standard applicable to
attorney disqualification for conflicts of interest and disqualified
an expert “without any predicate showing of actual breach.”178 The
rigid attorney disqualification test is wholly inconsistent with the
traditional expert disqualification test, and its application in the
expert context particularly offends the established principle that
actual disclosure of confidential information is a prerequisite to
expert disqualification.179 Furthermore, applying the attorney
disqualification test to expert witnesses fails to appreciate the
different roles of attorneys and experts in our legal system.
In fact, several courts have considered and explicitly
rejected the extension of the attorney-client privilege to expert
witnesses. In Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co.,180 the court
denied a defendant’s motion to disqualify, stating that while the
attorney-client privilege is “designed to preserve the public trust
in the integrity of the judicial system by preventing an attorney
from engaging in the unseemly practice of representing different
parties to the same litigation at different times,” there are many
communications between a client and expert witness that are not
privileged.181 Further, the court reasoned, “there is less stigma
174 Id. at 489 (“The attorney-client privilege, set out in N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-20,
protects not only communications between an attorney and his client but also extends to
communications made to any agent of the attorney.” (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:84A-20)).
175 Id. at 491.
176 Id.
177 Marvin Lumber &Cedar Co. v. Norton Co., 113 F.R.D. 588 (D.Minn. 1986).
178 Id. at 591.
179 See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
180 Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
181 Id. at 281.
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attached to an expert ‘changing sides’ in the midst of litigation
than [there is for] an attorney” who switches sides.182
Other federal and state courts have similarly rejected the
application of the attorney-client privilege to expert witnesses
because experts and attorneys serve different roles in the judicial
process, and they “rightly justify differing standards.”183
Specifically, while “[e]xperts act as sources of information and
opinions in order to assist parties and triers of facts to understand
evidence,” attorneys are advocates for their clients.184 This
alternative to the traditional test ignores critical distinctions
between the roles and responsibilities of attorneys and experts
and further highlights the need for a uniform test for experts.185
III. RESOLVINGDISPARITIES IN THE EXPERT
DISQUALIFICATION TEST
The judiciary has utilized its power to prevent and correct
abuses arising from the conduct of expert witnesses. Yet some
judges have refrained from exercising their discretion, which has
contributed to courts’ reticence to disqualify experts.186 Due to
concerns about separation of powers, the Supreme Court in Degen
v. United States urged trial judges to engage in self-restraint187
and limit the use of their inherent authority only to “reasonable
reponse[s] to the problems and needs that provoke it.”188 The vast
consequences stemming from the currently ambiguous
disqualification test indeed provoke the need for judicial
intervention. Unlike the myriad of tools available to judges to
disqualify attorneys,189 inherent judicial authority remains the
182 Id.
183 Mitchell v. Wilmore, 981 P.2d 172, 175 (Colo. 1999).
184 United States ex rel. Cherry Hill Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Healthcare
Rehab Sys., Inc., 994 F. Supp. 244, 249 (D.N.J. 1997).
185 See infra Section III.A.4.
186 Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996) (“The extent of these
powers must be delimited with care, for there is a danger of overreaching when one
branch of the Government, without benefit of cooperation or correction from the others,
undertakes to define its own authority.”). Appreciating their vast discretionary power
and the potential for abuse, courts have rarely relied on their inherent judicial
authority to disqualify expert witnesses. See, e.g., Koch Ref. Co. v. Jennifer L.
Boudreaux MV, 85 F.3d 1178, 1181, 1183 (5th Cir. 1996).
187 Degen, 517 U.S. at 823; see also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S.
752, 764 (1980) (“Because inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic
controls, they must be exercised with restraint and discretion.”).
188 Degen, 517 U.S. at 823-24; see Coffey, supra note 36, at 200 (“[W]hile
inherent authority has evolved over almost two centuries as a permanent dimension of
the judicial tapestry, it is a fabric threaded with caution.”).
189 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991). The Supreme Court
noted that inherent judicial authority to sanction attorneys is only one of many
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only viable option for judicial regulation of conflicts of interest
among expert witnesses.
To preserve the public’s confidence in the judicial process,
courts must adhere to a uniform set of rules to determine when a
conflict of interest warrants disqualification of an expert. To
safeguard the integrity of the judicial system, the judiciary should
amend the expert disqualification test to eliminate the
ambiguities present in the current test and to ensure uniformity
across jurisdictions. To achieve this end, the judiciary should first
narrow the definition of a confidential relationship and only
disqualify experts when a formal contractual relationship exists.
Second, to resolve the confusion regarding the meaning of the
traditional disqualification test’s second prong, judges should
inquire into whether confidential or privileged information was
disclosed to the expert that sufficiently relates to the subject matter
of the case at issue. Additionally, courts should strictly limit their
analysis to the two prongs of the proposed disqualification test and
exclude ambiguous public policy considerations from their analysis.
A. Amending the Traditional Expert Disqualification Test
The traditional disqualification test has been criticized for
creating arbitrary, and often contradictory, precedent that offers
little guidance to litigators, experts, and judges. To resolve the
current discrepancies in judicial decisions in the area of expert
disqualification, the traditional two-prong test must be amended
to promote clarity, consistency, and uniformity in how courts
apply the test. First, the criteria for disqualification should only
subject experts to disqualification where a contractual
relationship exists between the client and expert. Second, judges
should only grant disqualification if the client disclosed to the
expert confidential or privileged information that substantially
relates to the litigation at issue. The proposed framework
governing conflicts of interest among expert witnesses should not
supersede a party’s informed consent.190 These revisions to the
current two-prong approach would eliminate the need for courts
to evaluate public policy considerations in determining whether to
“mechanisms,” including statutes and rules, that courts may utilize to discipline
attorneys, and it held that the availability of statutes and rules governing attorney
sanctions do not displace courts’ inherent power to impose sanctions. Id.
190 See ABA GUIDELINES DRAFT, supra note 41, at 1, 5. In the context of
disqualification of attorneys for conflicts of interest, the affected clients may provide
informed consent and waive the right to seek disqualification of the attorney for a
conflict of interest. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
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disqualify an expert witness. The proposed disqualification test
offers a concrete solution to ensure that only those experts who
could harm their former clients are disqualified. Additionally, the
proposed disqualification test will align the expert disqualification
framework with the attorney disqualification test, while
appreciating the different roles of attorneys and experts.
1. Only a Contractual Relationship Should Create
Confidentiality
The first inquiry of the traditional test for expert witness
disqualification—whether it is objectively reasonable for the
movant to conclude that a confidential relationship existed with
the expert—is ambiguous, which contributes to inconsistent court
rulings on this prong. In addition, due to disparities in how they
analyze this prong, courts have failed to notify parties about what
constitutes inappropriate behavior or what behavior would even
impart a duty of confidentiality on the expert. Courts should
require a moving party to show a contractual relationship
between the movant and the expert witness to resolve current
ambiguities surrounding the disqualification test’s first prong.
Limiting the scope of the first prong of the traditional
test to the existence of a contractual agreement that includes a
confidentiality clause would eliminate situations that have led
courts to grant disqualification even when neither party
intentionally acted inappropriately.191 Defining a confidential
relationship as a contractual one “would be an ideal way to
eliminate questions”192 of what constitutes an objectively
reasonable confidential relationship and the need for hindsight to
determine whether the attorney explicitly told the expert not to
disclose confidential information.193 Instead, all such requests
should be placed into a “formal, written contract establishing
both the existence of the relationship and prohibiting the
disclosure of any [confidential] information gained by the
expert during the course of the relationship.”194
Securing a contractual agreement between client195 and
expert will enable the expert to appreciate his obligation to
191 Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246, 1249 (E.D. Va. 1991).
192 Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271, 279 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
193 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. EMCCorp., 330 F. Supp. 2d. 1087, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
194 Paul, 123 F.R.D. at 279.
195 Although this contract may theoretically be made between the expert and
the attorney who is hiring the expert on behalf of the client or between the expert and
the client, for the purposes of this note, the contract—and accordingly, the contractual
relationship—is described as existing between the client and the expert. In the common
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protect all information that the client or client’s attorney provides
is confidential.196 Additionally, before retaining an expert, counsel
should inquire about the expert’s “prior retention or attempted
retention and the nature of all disclosures”197 to enable the hiring
attorney to identify the expert’s potential involvement with
attorneys that may represent parties who are adverse to the
litigation at issue. To clarify an expert’s obligations, attorneys
who seek to create a confidential relationship with an expert
“should make this intention unmistakably clear and should
confirm it in writing.”198 Furthermore, the contract between
attorney and expert should include a confidentiality clause that
explains the expert’s confidentiality obligation and describes
conditions of retention.199 Specifically, the retention letter “should
define the relationship, including its scope and limitations, and
should outline the responsibilities of the testifying expert,
especially regarding the disclosure of client confidences.”200
Mandating that in order to satisfy the first prong of the expert
disqualification test expert and client must enter a contractual
relationship will enable experts to avoid prohibited or unethical
conduct and empower the courts to follow an unambiguous
standard in analyzing this prong.
2. Subject Matter Should Be Related
Upon the satisfaction of the first prong, the second prong
would determine whether the moving party has revealed to the
expert confidential information, the nature of which substantially
relates to the subject matter of the litigation at issue. Unless the
disclosed information relates to the case at issue, the revised
disqualification test would not preclude an expert “hired by one
attorney in a particular type of litigation . . . from offering his
services to that particular attorney’s adversary in an unrelated
matter.”201 The proposed second prong of the test would broadly
construe “confidential information” under the work-product test
to encompass “an attorney’s mental processes reflected in
scenario, which is the focus of this note, the retention of the expert is handled by the
attorney on behalf of the client. The practical and legal ramifications of the contract
being entered into by the expert and the client, however, would be identical to the
contract being created between the expert and the attorney.
196 See ABA GUIDELINESDRAFT, supra note 41, at 6.
197 Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246, 1250 (E.D. Va. 1991).
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 ABA Standing Comm. on Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 97-407 (1997).
201 Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. Div. of Bldg. & Constr., Dep’t of Treasury, 405
A.2d 487, 492 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
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‘interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs,
mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible
and intangible . . . materials.’”202 To protect confidence, attorneys
should explicitly label all work-product communications with the
expert as confidential attorney work product.203 To warrant
disqualification, however, the disclosed confidential or privileged
information must bear on the subject matter of the case at issue.
This approach to the second prong of the disqualification test
would promote fairness and enable experts to pursue their trade
while protecting clients’ confidences.
If a court determines that a relationship of confidence
existed between client and expert and confidential information
was disclosed, the court should not disqualify the expert unless it
determines that the subject matter of the challenged litigation is
substantially similar to a prior or concurrent case. Although
numerous courts have applied this approach,204 its fundamental
inquiry has not gained widespread adoption or incorporation into
the traditional disqualification test. As a result, judges have often
ignored it. In the context of conflict of interest among attorneys,
judges have deemed matters substantially related “when it is likely
that confidential information . . . obtained while representing the
former client can be used against . . . [that client] in the present
representation.”205 Under the proposed expert disqualification
test, if the moving party sufficiently demonstrates the existence of
a contractual relationship and that the client disclosed to the
expert confidential information relating to the instant litigation,
then a court should enjoin the expert from testifying against the
former client. Where the subject matter of the current and
previous cases is sufficiently similar to present a risk of harm to
the former client, the disclosure of confidential information
relevant to the case at hand “makes it impossible to conceive of a
situation in which [the expert] could conscientiously” expunge this
knowledge while serving the opposing side.206
Thus, to disqualify an expert under the proposed
framework, a court must find that the expert had a contractual
agreement with the first client and that the client disclosed
confidential information related to the case at hand. Both prongs
202 People v. Martinez, 970 P.2d 469, 475 (Colo. 1998) (quoting Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947)).
203 Wang Labs., Inc., 762 F. Supp. at 1250.
204 See supra notes 104-06, 110-26 and accompanying text.
205 John Leubsdorf, Conflicts of Interest: Slicing the Hot Potato Doctrine, 48
SANDIEGO L. REV. 251, 253 (2011).
206 Conforti & Eisele, Inc., 405 A.2d at 492.
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would be weighed equally. The court’s finding that one prong is
satisfied would not create a presumption in favor of the other. For
instance, in Lacroix v. BIC Corp., although it was clear that the
expert and his former client entered into a contractual
arrangement mandating confidentiality (satisfying the first prong
of the proposed test),207 the court properly denied disqualification
because the former client did not disclose information directly
bearing on the subject matter of the litigation at issue.
Furthermore, judges should refrain from using the often
imprecise public policy considerations as a separate prong,
because such considerations will be implicitly incorporated into
the substance of the test.208 This test will allow experts to pursue
their professional calling by enabling them to accept engagements
from opposing clients so long as the subject matter of the cases is
sufficiently different. At the same time, the proposed test is
mindful of the need to protect client confidentiality. This test will
not punish experts by virtue of their dual retention by opposing
clients; rather, it will disqualify experts because of their receipt of
confidential or privileged information that they could use to the
detriment of their former client in a closely related case. And
unlike in an amorphous balancing test where a judge is free to
weigh different factors according to preference, a bright-line rule
will provide clarity and predictability to this area of law, which
will make the already expensive task of retaining experts that
much less costly.
Finally, the proposed expert disqualification test would
not displace a party’s informed consent.209 When adverse parties
become aware of a potential conflict of interest, the parties may
discuss the apparent conflict and consent to the arrangement. A
party’s informed consent should be specified in writing, however,
to avoid subsequent motions to disqualify the expert. In Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., the court reasoned that since the
parties were aware of the relevant relationships with the expert,
they were in a position to prevent any improper future
disclosures.210 Thus, with proper consent, it would be inappropriate
for the court to interfere with one party’s choice of expert or force
an expert to decline employment.
207 Lacroix v. BIC Corp., 339 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201 (D. Mass. 2004).
208 See infra Section III.C.
209 For a discussion of informed consent in the attorney disqualification
context, see supra note 191 and accompanying text.
210 Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp., 734 F. Supp. 334,
339 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
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B. Implications of the Proposed Disqualification Test
If both prongs of the proposed disqualification test are
satisfied, the court should not consider public policy concerns,
because such considerations will be implicitly incorporated into
the substance of the test. The proposed first prong of the
disqualification test would protect expert witnesses’ livelihood
and the pursuit of their professional calling. By limiting the
inquiry to whether there is a contractual relationship, the test
precludes disqualification of experts who received privileged
information “in the absence of a formal contractual relationship.”211
If an expert witness “has doubts that she or he wants to be
retained, those doubts should be unequivocally expressed” prior to
an expert’s formal retention.212 If those doubts remain unsettled,
the expert should decline to accept the engagement. By narrowing
the scope of the first prong, however, the burden is on the hiring
client or attorney to ensure “that the expert understands the type
of relationship which exists[ ] and the need to keep information
disclosed during the course of that relationship confidential.”213
Thus, by limiting the notion of a confidential relationship
to a contractual one, an expert would not face the prospect of
disqualification unless the expert signs a contract. This would
eliminate ambiguities in the current definition of a confidential
relationship between counsel and expert and provide guidance to
litigants, experts, and judges on this subject. The expert would be
free to meet and consult with clients, even adverse ones, and
weigh the benefits of prospective retention before choosing to
enter into a binding contract with a confidentiality clause and
establishing a confidential relationship within the meaning of the
first prong of the disqualification test. This solution to the first
prong of the test would prevent experts from being preemptively
disqualified because of ambiguous standards. Remarkably, this
would enable experts to predict in advance when they would be
disqualified and would protect litigants from retaining an expert
they might later be required to replace.
Unlike the current test, which allows for disqualification
when an expert receives confidential information completely
unrelated to the case at issue, the proposed second prong of the
expert disqualification test prevents disqualification unless the
disclosed information is so intertwined with the case in question
211 Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271, 278 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
212 Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246, 1250 (E.D. Va. 1991).
213 Paul, 123 F.R.D. at 279.
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that the information can be used to the detriment of the expert’s
former client. On one hand, the proposed amendment to the
second prong implicitly incorporates public policy considerations
against the movant because the rigorous test would require the
movant to show more than what is required under the current
framework. On the other hand, the proposed test protects the
nonmovant from frivolous disqualification motions.
Under the proposed second prong, the movant bears a
high burden to show that the expert entered into a contractual
relationship and received confidential and privileged information
and that the disclosed information substantially relates to the
litigation in question. At the same time, the proposed
disqualification test eliminates the concern that the movant may
form a confidential relationship with an expert solely to prevent
adversaries from using the same expert. Even if a litigant goes as
far as entering into a contractual relationship with an expert to
preclude his or her retention by opposing counsel, the expert will
not be disqualified solely because a contractual relationship
exists. Without a robust disqualification test, attorneys may use a
ploy to “disable potentially troublesome experts merely by
retaining them . . . to prevent opposing lawyers from obtaining an
expert.”214 Under the proposed test, to warrant disqualification,
the moving party must show that the client disclosed confidential
information to the expert that the expert could exploit to the
detriment of the client. The proposed test disables parties from
using the disqualification test as a procedural weapon.215
C. Rejecting the Attorney Disqualification Test
The proposed two-prong disqualification test should be the
only test governing conflict of interest disputes between experts
and clients. The few courts that have applied the attorney
disqualification test to expert witnesses have ignored established
precedent and drastically diverged from the principles and
purposes of the expert disqualification test. The duties and
obligations imparted on attorneys by the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct require attorneys to protect their current
and former clients’ confidential information.216 Experts have
different roles and serve different functions in the judicial system
214 Wang Labs., Inc., 762 F. Supp. at 1248.
215 Richmond, Expert Witness Conflicts, supra note 19, at 928.
216 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
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than do attorneys.217 Experts do not serve as advocates for their
clients,218 and thus they do not owe their clients the “undivided
loyalty that a lawyer owes his clients.”219 Although lawyers work
closely with experts and assist them in preparing their trial
testimony, it is necessary “to maintain a sharp distinction between
their roles.”220 Specifically, attorneys are zealous advocates for their
clients.221 Experts’ role in the judicial process is quite the opposite:
experts serve as independent sources of information to assist
triers of facts in making sense of technical and complex
evidence.222 Accordingly, to remain independent, experts must
stay “detached, if not wholly aloof, from the client’s goals.”223
Recognizing this critical distinction, the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York expressly “decline[d] to extend
the same prophylactic rule governing attorneys to experts.”224
The application of the attorney-client privilege to expert
witnesses ignores critical distinctions between the roles and
responsibilities of attorneys and experts and further highlights
the need for a uniform disqualification test for experts. The
proposed two-prong expert disqualification test appreciates the
different roles of attorneys and experts while protecting
against the disclosure of clients’ confidences that may be used
to those clients’ detriment. Furthermore, the proposed expert
disqualification test will facilitate frank communication between
clients, attorneys, and experts without imposing the strict
obligations imposed on attorneys.
Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers
are prohibited from “us[ing] information relating to representation
of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client gives
informed consent.”225 The proposed expert disqualification test will
217 EEOC v. Locals 14 & 15, Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, No. 72 Civ. 2498
(VLB), 1981 WL 163, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1981).
218 Id.
219 Richmond, Expert Witness Conflicts, supra note 19, at 911; see ABA
Standing Comm. on Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 97-407 (1997) (“A duty to advance a
client’s objectives diligently through all lawful measures, which is inherent in a client-
lawyer relationship, is inconsistent with the duty of a testifying expert.”).
220 Lubet, supra note 38, at 468.
221 United States ex rel. Cherry Hill Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Healthcare
Rehab Sys., Inc., 994 F. Supp. 244, 249 (D.N.J. 1997).
222 Id.; Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246, 1250 (E.D. Va.
1991) (“Experts, strictly speaking, are not advocates; they are sources of information
and opinions in technical, scientific, medical or other fields of knowledge.”).
223 Lubet, supra note 38, at 474; see Justin P. Murphy, Expert Witnesses at
Trial: Where Are the Ethics?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217, 230 (2000).
224 EEOC v. Locals 14 & 15, Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, No. 72 Civ. 2498
(VLB), 1981 WL 163, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1981).
225 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
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achieve the same goal without overburdening experts with
stringent standards that do nothing more than prevent useful
expert knowledge from reaching juries. By limiting disqualification
to situations where an expert receives confidential information
reasonably related to the case in question, the proposed test will
preclude experts from using confidential information to the former
client’s disadvantage, thus alleviating the need to apply the
stringent attorney disqualification test.
D. Amending the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The proposed test offers a feasible solution to the
ambiguity currently plaguing expert disqualification. To avoid
the need for judicial intervention, however, the ABA should
amend its Model Rules of Professional Conduct to include
provisions related to conflicts of interest among expert witnesses.
This preventive approach would work in conjunction with the
proposed disqualification test. While the proposed test would offer
clear and consistent guidelines for resolving disqualification
disputes, the amended Model Rules would enable litigants and
experts to proactively avoid conflicts of interest that warrant
disqualification. The ABA’s Task Force on Expert Model Rules of
Ethics drafted a cohesive set of rules to govern experts’ conduct
in “ABA Guidelines for Retention of Experts by Lawyers.”226 But
the ABA’s House of Delegates withdrew the proposal from
consideration, leaving the field of conflicts of interest among
experts unaddressed.227 The ABA should reconsider several
provisions from its guidelines in order to provide direction to
lawyers when hiring experts, consequently preventing future
disqualification motions.228 The proposed additions to the Model
Rules would not distort the current obligations that attorneys have
to their clients. Rather, the additions would supply attorneys with
preventive measures to avoid potential conflicts of interest leading
to disqualification. Although the conduct of attorneys and experts
alike have contributed to conflicts of interest, the ABA proposal
focuses on the attorney’s role and responsibilities since the
226 ABA GUIDELINESDRAFT, supra note 41, at 7.
227 Robert Ambrogi, ABA Rejects Proposed Expert Witness Guidelines,
BULLSEYE BLOG (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.ims-expertservices.com/bullseye/september-
2012/aba-rejects-proposed-expert-witness-guidelines/ [http://perma.cc/8S9C-RF5Q].
228 Id.
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Model Rules only govern the conduct of attorneys (and not
expert witnesses).229
To prevent the need for disqualification, first, the ABA
should adopt the following proposed provision, “Conflicts of
Interest”: “Unless the client provides informed consent, the
lawyer should take steps to ensure that the expert’s acceptance of
the engagement will not create a conflict of interest.”230 The hiring
lawyer should conduct a conflict of interest check to ensure that
the expert’s retention will not be “materially limited by the
expert’s duties to other clients, the expert’s relationship to third
parties, or the expert’s own interests.”231
Second, the ABA should adopt a provision, “Disclosure,”
that would state, “Prior to retention of an expert witness,
attorneys should require experts to disclose existing relationships
with current clients and other parties that may cause an expert’s
conflict of interest.”232 The retaining lawyer should inquire into all
potential conflicts to ferret out problematic engagements.233
Additionally, attorneys should impose a continuing obligation on
the expert to disclose any potential conflicts of interest that may
arise during the course of the expert’s retention and until the
expert’s engagement is terminated.234
The proposed “Disclosure” provision would further instruct
lawyers, prior to formally retaining an expert, to inquire about all
of the witness’s prior testimony given in the last seven years,235 as
well as former engagements where the witness was retained but
did not testify. A conflict of interest check that inquires into the
expert’s previous formal and prospective employments would
enable all parties to avoid inadvertent conflicts warranting
disqualification. In Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., the
court suggested that prior to retaining an expert, a lawyer should
inquire about past retentions, and “if the second retention is
effected, the fact should be promptly disclosed to opposing counsel
and the matter discussed thoroughly in an effort to resolve the
dispute before it is raised in court.”236 Thus, to avoid the need to
229 The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct establish clear rules for
attorney conduct but do not have the force of law. LISA G. LERMAN& PHILIP G. SCHRAG,
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 33 (3d ed. 2012). State and local bar
associations independently draft and publish Rules of Professional Conduct, which
must then be adopted by the highest court of the state. Id. at 31, 33.
230 ABA GUIDELINESDRAFT, supra note 41, at 7.
231 Id.
232 See id. at 7-8.
233 Richmond, Expert Witness Conflicts, supra note 19, at 927.
234 ABA GUIDELINESDRAFT, supra note 41, at 8.
235 See id. at 7.
236 Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246, 1250 (E.D. Va. 1991).
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file a motion to disqualify an expert, a lawyer should specifically
instruct the expert witness to disclose prior testimony and
engagements that directly bear on the subject matter in question.237
This requirement would prevent attorneys from
discovering a conflict of interest long after the attorney retains
the expert. Early discovery of conflicts is especially important
because expert witnesses face extensive cross-examination about
their qualifications, opinions and sources of such opinions, and
prior testimony.238 Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
merely require counsel to disclose to the adverse party all cases in
which the expert witness has testified in the past four years,239
nothing precludes opposing counsel from finding additional cases
to discredit the expert. Particularly, experts “may be vulnerable
because of inconsistencies in statements on the same subject in
testimony in unrelated cases,”240 regardless of when the expert
made such statements. In other words, expert witnesses expose
themselves to impeachment for prior inconsistent statements
even if their opinion has reasonably changed since the time of the
prior statement.241 If opposing counsel discovers inconsistent
positions in the expert’s testimony—especially testimony bearing
on the subject matter of the challenged litigation—the adverse
party is likely to introduce such statements during cross-
examination to discredit the expert’s opinion in the challenged
litigation.242 Thus, “to inform the retaining lawyer of materials
that may be useful to the other side in cross examination” of the
expert, the ABA should expand the expert’s “disclosure
obligation[s] to retaining lawyers . . . beyond those required”243 by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Finally, the ABA should adopt the proposed
“Confidentiality” provision:
The lawyer must assure that the expert treats any information
received or work product produced by the expert during an
engagement as confidential, and secure an understanding from the
expert that he or she shall not disclose any such information except as
237 Id.
238 LEMPERT ET AL., supra note 16, at 1149. The scope of cross-examination of
experts often extends beyond what is expected—and permitted—during cross-
examination of lay witnesses. Hope v. Arrowhead & Puritas Waters, Inc., 344 P.2d 428,
433 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
239 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(v).
240 LEMPERT ET AL., supra note 16, at 1149.
241 Hope, 344 P.2d at 433.
242 See Ben B. Rubinowitz & Evan Torgan, Trial Advocacy, Impeachment with
a Prior Inconsistent Statement, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 6, 2006.
243 ABA GUIDELINESDRAFT, supra note 41, at 8.
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required by law, as retaining counsel shall determine and advise, or
with the consent of the client.244
Of course, a client and expert may agree to include such a
provision in the expert’s retention letter.245 But, nonetheless,
adopting this provision would considerably prevent potential
conflicts of interest, thus diminishing the chances that an expert
may be subject to a disqualification motion.
If the ABA reconsiders and adopts the aforementioned
guidelines, the rules of the expert’s profession (if such rules exist)
should guide the expert’s conduct.246 For instance, some experts in
medicine, accounting, and psychotherapy must abide by ethical
standards governing their profession.247 But notably absent from
such ethical codes are provisions relating to conflicts of interest.248
Thus, to ensure that a stringent standard governs experts’
conduct, when a given profession has no code of ethics, or if the
ABA guidelines are more lenient than the proposed ethical code in
the profession, the more stringent standard should govern
experts’ behavior.249
244 Id. at 5.
245 Lubet, supra note 38, at 475.
246 ABA GUIDELINESDRAFT, supra note 41, at 2.
247 Lubet, supra note 38, at 467 nn. 11-12, 14 (citing CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Acct. 1997); PRINCIPLES OFMEDICAL ETHICS (Am.
Med. Ass’n 1996); ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND CODE OF CONDUCT § 7 (AM.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N 1992).
248 Sonenshein & Fitzpatrick, supra note 17, at 19 (2013) (“Even if these
guidelines can help the testifying expert, they still do little to solve the ethical
problems of expert testimony.”).
249 ABA GUIDELINES DRAFT, supra note 41, at 2. For example, the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ Code of Professional Conduct (AICPA Code)
and the National Society of Professional Engineers’ Code of Ethics for Engineers
(NSPE Code) provide comprehensive guidelines for expert witnesses belonging to those
organizations. The AICPA Code mandates that the Institute’s members be “free of
conflicts of interest.” AICPA Code § 54.01 (2009).
A conflict of interest may occur if a member performs a professional service for a
client or employer and the member or his or her firm has a relationship with
another person, entity, product, or service that could, in the member’s
professional judgment, be viewed by the client, employer, or other appropriate
parties as impairing the member’s objectivity. If the member believes that the
professional service can be performed with objectivity, and the relationship is
disclosed to and consent is obtained from such client, employer, or other
appropriate parties, the rule shall not operate to prohibit the performance of the
professional service.
AICPA Code § 102.03. Furthermore, members are forbidden from disclosing clients’
confidential information without their consent. AICPA Code § 301.01. The NSPE Code
prohibits its members from disclosing “facts, data or information without the prior
consent of the client.” NSPE Code § II.1.c. “Engineers shall disclose all known or
potential conflicts of interest that could influence or appear to influence their judgment
or the quality of their services.” NSPE Code § II.4.a. “Engineers shall not accept
compensation, financial or otherwise, from more than one party for services on the
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CONCLUSION
The expert disqualification test currently used in federal
and state courts has muddied the traditional test used to resolve
conflicts of interest in the expert witness context. The current test
is vague, confusing, and provides little in the way of guidance to
attorneys and experts alike. Trial courts have struggled to
interpret the two-prong disqualification test announced in Paul v.
Rawlings Sporting Goods Co.,250 which has resulted in
unpredictable rulings and inconsistent precedent. The lack of
statutory guidance, coupled with judicial discord regarding the
appropriate standard for disqualification, threatens the integrity
of the judicial system and imposes costly uncertainty on litigants.
To prevent further conflict among the courts and confusion among
litigants and experts alike, a clear and comprehensive approach
to expert disqualification is necessary.
To alleviate the current concerns presented by the
disqualification test, this note advocates for modification of the
traditional expert disqualification test. The proposed test would
provide a narrowly tailored, two-prong inquiry. This test would
warrant disqualification of experts only if the expert was in a
contractual relationship with the moving party and if the moving
party disclosed confidential or privileged information that
significantly related to the subject matter of the litigation. The
proposed two-prong expert disqualification test would eliminate
the need for a three-prong test that includes public policy
considerations, since this proposal incorporates the courts’ various
attempts to balance the desire to preserve relevant expert
testimony against the need to protect clients’ confidentiality. This
solution would adequately protect clients’ confidentiality while
recognizing the different roles of attorneys and experts.
In addition to the proposed two-prong approach to expert
disqualification, this note also advocates for amendments to the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. These amendments would
bring consistency and clarity to the current Rules and would work
in tandem with the proposed expert disqualification test to
prevent conflicts of interest. The amended Rules would serve as a
preventive measure and one that would make certain that
attorneys and experts have meaningful guidance to help shape
same project, or for services pertaining to the same project, unless the circumstances
are fully disclosed and agreed to by all interested parties.” NSPE Code § II.4.b.
250 Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
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their behavior, thus decreasing the overall frequency of, and need
for, disqualification proceedings.
Due to the proliferation of expert testimony in civil
litigation, without a clear and strict standard governing the
disqualification of experts, the integrity of the judicial system
will remain at stake, and parties to litigation will be challenged
to find competent and conflict-free expert witnesses. These
proposed new rules of war in the battle of the experts will
provide certainty to an area of litigation that has thus far been
marred by costly uncertainty.
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